Conference  by unknown
29th BETHESDA CONFERENCE
Ethics in Cardiovascular Medicine (1997)
October 23–24, 1997
JACC Vol. 31, No. 5
April 1998:917–49
917
©1998 by the American College of Cardiology 0735-1097/98/$19.00
Published by Elsevier Science Inc. PII S0735-1097(98)00046-1
BETHESDA CONFERENCE REPORT
29th Bethesda Conference: Ethics in Cardiovascular Medicine (1997)*
WILLIAM W. PARMLEY, MD, FACC, CONFERENCE CO-CHAIR
EUGENE R. PASSAMANI, MD, FACC, CONFERENCE CO-CHAIR
This Conference, sponsored by the American College of Cardiology, was held at Heart
House, Bethesda, Maryland, October 23–24, 1997.
Participants
JOHN E. ABELE
Founder Chairman
Boston Scientific Corporation
One Boston Scientific Place
Natick, Massachusetts 01760
RICHARD P. ANDERSON, MD
2226 Fairview Avenue, East
Seattle, Washington 98102
Society of Thoracic Surgeons, President-Elect
LOFTY BASTA, MD, FRCP, FACC, FCCP,
FACA
Professor of Medicine
Director, USF Division of Cardiology
Harbourside Medical Tower
Suite 630
4 Columbia Drive
Tampa, Florida 33606
HARVEY W. BENDER, JR., MD, FACC
Department of Cardiothoracic Surgery
Vanderbilt University Medical Center
1611 21st Avenue, South
Nashville, Tennessee 37232
American Association for Thoracic Surgery
Representative
JAMES R. BIRGE, MD
Medical Director and CEO
MacGregor Medical Association
2550 Holly Hall
Houston, Texas 77054
JAMES C. BLANKENSHIP, MD, FACC
Director, Cardiac Cath Labs
Department of Cardiology 13-43
Geisinger Medical Center
Danville, Pennsylvania 17821
Chair, ACC Coding and Nomenclature
Committee
LAWRENCE I. BONCHEK, MD, FACC,
FACS
Surgical Director
Mid-Atlantic Heart Institute
Lancaster General Hospital
555 North Duke Street
P.O. Box 3555
Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17603
ALFRED A. BOVE, MD, PHD, FACC
Chief of Cardiology
Temple University Hospital
3401 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19140
Chair, ACC Information and
Technology Committee
MARK D. CARLSON, MD, FACC
Associate Professor of Medicine
Vice Chairman, Clinical Affairs
University Hospital of Cleveland
Department of Cardiology
11100 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44106-5029
North American Society for Pacing &
Electrophysiology Representative
Chair, NASPE Ethics Committee
DAVID B. CARMICHAEL, MD, FACC
Cardiologist
Clinical Professor of Medicine
University of California at San Diego
8333 Calle del Cielo
La Jolla, California 92037
RUTH COLLINS-NAKAI, MD, FACC
Professor of Pediatrics
Faculty of Medicine and Oral Health Sciences
2C3.86 Walter Mackenzie Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2B7
Canada
C. RICHARD CONTI, MD, FACC
Palm Beach Eminent Scholar, Cardiology
Professor of Medicine
Chief, Division of Cardiology
P.O. Box 100277
1600 SW Archer Road
Gainesville, Florida 32610
DEBORAH DANOFF, MD
Assistant Vice President
Division of Medical Education
2450 N Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1127
Association of American Medical Colleges
Representative
PRAKASH C. DEEDWANIA, MD, FACC
Clinical Professor of Medicine
UCSF School of Medicine
Chief, Cardiology Division
VAMC/USCF Program at Fresno (111C)
2615 East Clinton Avenue
Fresno, California 93703
T. ANTHONY DON MICHAEL, MD, PHD,
FACC
Clinical Professor of Medicine, UCLA
President, Central Cardiac Medical Clinic
2110 Truxtun Avenue
Bakersfield, California 93301
BERNARD W. FONG, MD, FACC
Clinical Professor of Medicine
John A. Burns School of Medicine
97 Dowsett Avenue
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
*The recommendations set forth in this report are those of the Conference participants and do not necessarily reflect
the official position of the American College of Cardiology.
Address for reprints: American College of Cardiology, 9111 Old Georgetown Road, Bethesda, Maryland 20814.
Attention: Educational Services Department (800-257-4740).
JACC Vol. 31, No. 5
April 1998:917–49
918
JAMES S. FORRESTER, MD, FACC
Director, Cardiovascular Research
Burns and Allen Chair in Cardiology
Room 5314, North Tower
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
8700 Beverly Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90048
Chair, ACC Technology and Practice
Executive Committee
ROBERT L. FRYE, MD, FACC
Chair, Department of Medicine
Mayo Clinic
200 First Street, SW
Rochester, Minnesota 55905
THOMAS P. GRAHAM, MD, FACC
Director, Pediatric Cardiology
Vanderbilt University Medical Center
D2212 MCN
1161 21st Avenue South
Nashville, Tennessee 37232-2572
GRAEME L. HAMMOND, MD
Professor of Surgery
Yale University School of Medicine
333 Cedar Street, 121 FMB
New Haven, Connecticut 06510
American College of Surgeons Representative
IBRAHIM HELMY, MD, FACC
Cardiologist—Electrophysiology
575 E. Hardy Street, #104
Inglewood, California 90301-4025
MARK O. HIEPLER, ESQ.
Partner
Law Offices of Hiepler & Hiepler
500 Esplanade Drive, Suite 1550
Oxnard, California 93030
WARREN JANOWITZ, MD, JD
Associate Director, Cardiac Imaging
Miami Cardiac and Vascular Institute
Baptist Hospital of Miami
8900 Kendall Drive
Miami, Florida 33176
Society of Nuclear Medicine Representative
ALBERT H. JENEMANN, SJ, PHD
Associate Professor of Philosophy
St. Joseph’s University
5600 City Avenue
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19131
GERALD JOHNSTON, MD
Chairman, Department of Nuclear Medicine
Washington Hospital Center
110 Irving Street, NW
Washington, DC 20010
American College of Nuclear
Medicine Representative
JEROME P. KASSIRER, MD
Editor-in-Chief
New England Journal of Medicine
10 Shattuck Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02115
Keynote Speaker
J. WARD KENNEDY, MD, FACC
Seattle VA Medical Center
Cardiology 111C
1660 South Columbian Way
Box 358280-11C
Seattle, Washington 98102
SPENCER B. KING III, MD, FACC
Professor of Medicine (Cardiology)
Emory University Hospital
1364 Clifton Road, NE
F606
Atlanta, Georgia 30322
President-Elect, American College of Cardiology
GERALD A. KLASSEN, MD, FRCPC, FACC,
FACP
Professor of Medicine, Physiology and
Biophysics
Queen Elizabeth Health Sciences Centre
Room 2111, New Halifax Infirmary
P.O. Box 9000
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3K 6A3
Canada
FRANCIS J. KLOCKE, MD, FACC
Professor of Medicine and Director
Feinberg Cardiovascular Research Institute
Northwestern University Medical School
Tarry 12-703 (T233)
303 East Chicago Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611-3008
Chair, ACC Publications Committee
LYNN O. LANGDON, MS
Vice President for Subspecialty
Internal Medicine
510 Walnut Street
Suite 1700
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106-3699
American Board of Internal Medicine
Representative
WARREN LASKEY, MD
Professor of Medicine
Associate Director of Cardiology
University of Maryland Hospital
Division of Cardiology
22 South Greene Street, 53B08
Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1595
Society for Cardiac Angiography & Interventions
Representative
KERRY L. LEE, PHD
Associate Professor of Biostatistics
Duke University
Chief Statistician
Duke University Clinical Research Institute
2024 West Main Street, B-214
Durham, North Carolina 27705
RICHARD P. LEWIS, MD, FACC
Professor of Internal Medicine
The Ohio State University
1654 Upham Drive, 6th Floor, Means Hall
Columbus, Ohio 43210
Chair, ACC Educational Products Committee
BERNARD LO, MD
Professor of Medicine
Director, Department of Medical Ethics
University of California, San Francisco
521 Parnassus Avenue
Suite C-126
San Francisco, California 94143
JOANNE LYNN, MD, MA, MS
Director and Professor of Health Care
Science and Medicine
Center to Improve Care of the Dying
George Washington University
1001 22nd Street, NW
Suite 820
Washington, DC 20037
FRED W. LYONS, JR.
Retired Chairman
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.
KG2-M0838
P.O. Box 9627
Kansas City, Missouri 64134-0627
N. PATRICK MADIGAN, BM, BCH(OXON)
President, Susquehanna Medical Consultants,
PC
P.O. Box 388
Danville, Pennsylvania 17821
PETER R. MAHRER, MD, FACC, FSCAI
Director, Cardiology Research
Kaiser Permanente Medical Center, Los
Angeles
Clinical Professor of Medicine (Cardiology)
U.S.C. School of Medicine
1526 Edgemont, Building J
Los Angeles, California 90027
DAVID DUGALD MCPHERSON, MD
Northwestern Memorial Hospital
Northwestern University
250 East Superior, Suite 520
Chicago, Illinois 60611
American Society of Echocardiography
Representative
JACQUELINE A. NOONAN, MD, FACC
Professor of Pediatrics
Chief, Pediatric Cardiology
Department of Pediatrics
University of Kentucky Medical Center
800 Rose Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40536-0084
IRA S. OCKENE, MD, FACC
Professor of Medicine
University of Massachusetts Medical Center
55 Lake Avenue North
Worcester, Massachusetts 01655
American Heart Association Representative
RICHARD S. PANUSH, MD
Professor and Chairman
Department of Medicine
Saint Barnabas Medical Center
94 Old Short Hills Road
Livingston, New Jersey 07039
919JACC Vol. 31, No. 5 PARMLEY AND PASSAMANI
April 1998:917–49 29th BETHESDA CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
WILLIAM W. PARMLEY, MD, FACC
Professor of Medicine
University of California, San Francisco
1186 Moffitt Hospital
San Francisco, California 94143-0124
Editor-in-Chief, Journal of the American
College of Cardiology
Conference Co-Chair
EUGENE R. PASSAMANI, MD, FACC
5018 Loughboro Road, NW
Washington, DC 20016
Chair, ACC Ethics and Discipline Committee
Conference Co-Chair
RICHARD L. POPP, MD, FACC
Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Room M-121, Dean’s Office
300 Pasteur Drive
Stanford, California 94305-5302
President, American College of Cardiology
W. GERALD RAINER, MD, MS, FACC
Clinical Professor of Surgery
University of Colorado Health
Sciences Center
2005 Franklin Street, #380
Denver, Colorado 80205
JAMES L. RITCHIE, MD, FACC
Director, Division of Cardiology
University of Washington School of Medicine
1959 NE Pacific Street, AA510 Health
Science Building
Box 356422
Seattle, Washington 98195-6422
Chair, ACC/AHA Task Force on Practice
Guidelines
ROBERT ROBERTS, MD, FACC
Professor of Medicine and Cell Biology
Chief of Cardiology
Baylor College of Medicine
Section of Cardiology
6550 Fannin, MS SM677
Houston, Texas 77030
SIMEON A. RUBENSTEIN, MD, FACC
Medical Director of Corporate Health
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound
521 Wall Street
Seattle, Washington 98101
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound
Representative
THOMAS J. RYAN, MD, FACC
Professor of Medicine
Boston Medical Center
One Boston Medical Center Place
Section of Cardiology
Boston, Massachusetts 02118-2393
LAWRENCE J. SCHNEIDERMAN, MD
Professor, Department of Family and
Preventive Medicine
Department of Medicine
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, 0622
La Jolla, California 92093-0622
MARK E. SILVERMAN, MD, FACP, FACC
Chief of Cardiology
Piedmont Hospital
Professor of Medicine
Emory University School of Medicine
1968 Peachtree Road, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
American College of Physicians, Governor for
the Georgia Chapter
PETER A. SINGER, MD, MPH, FRCPC
Sun Life Chair in Bioethics
Director, University of Toronto Joint Centre
for Bioethics
88 College Street
Toronto, Ontario M5G 1L4
Canada
LOIS SNYDER, JD
Counsel for Ethics and Legal Affairs
6th and Race Streets
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106-1572
American College of Physicians Representative
RICHARD D. TWISS, MD, FACC
302 South 10th Avenue
Yakima, Washington 98902-3521
DANIEL J. ULLYOT, MD, FACC
Clinical Professor of Surgery
University of California San Francisco
1828 El Camino Real, Suite 802
Burlingame, California 94010
Chair, ACC Private Sector Relations Committee
SYLVAN LEE WEINBERG, MD, FACC
Clinical Professor of Medicine
Wright State University School of Medicine
Chairman of Cardiology
Good Samaritan Hospital
9000 N. Main Street
Suite 402
Dayton, Ohio 45415
Editor-in-Chief, ACCEL
Chair, ACC Institute for Studies in
Cardiovascular Medicine
MICHAEL J. WOLK, MD, FACC
520 East 72nd Street
New York, New York 10021-4849
Chair, ACC Budget, Finance and Investment
Committee
920 PARMLEY AND PASSAMANI JACC Vol. 31, No. 5
29th BETHESDA CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS April 1998:917–49
Acknowledgments
The American College of Cardiology greatly appreciates the financial support of the Institute for the Study of
Cardiovascular Medicine.
Conference Steering Committee
WILLIAM W. PARMLEY, MD, FACC, CONFERENCE CO-CHAIR
EUGENE R. PASSAMANI, MD, FACC, CONFERENCE CO-CHAIR
LOFTY L. BASTA, MD, FACC
ALFRED A. BOVE, MD, PHD, FACC
C. RICHARD CONTI, MD, FACC
ROBERT L. FRYE, MD, FACC
J. WARD KENNEDY, MD, FACC
SPENCER B. KING III, MD, FACC
RICHARD P. LEWIS, MD, FACC
ROBERT ROBERTS, MD, FACC
THOMAS J. RYAN, MD, FACC
DANIEL J. ULLYOT, MD, FACC
SYLVAN LEE WEINBERG, MD, FACC
Staff
American College of Cardiology
DAVID J. FEILD, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
PENNY S. MILLS, ASSOCIATE EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
CHARLENE L. MAY, DIRECTOR, CLINICAL PRACTICE AND GUIDELINES
SHERRI G. EICHBERG, CONFERENCE/DOCUMENT COORDINATOR
LISA B. BRADFIELD, CONFERENCE/DOCUMENT COORDINATOR
921JACC Vol. 31, No. 5 PARMLEY AND PASSAMANI
April 1998:917–49 29th BETHESDA CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
29th BETHESDA CONFERENCE
Introduction
WILLIAM W. PARMLEY, MD, FACC, CONFERENCE CO-CHAIR,
EUGENE R. PASSAMANI, MD, FACC, CONFERENCE CO-CHAIR, BERNARD LO, MD
The revolution in managed care has not only drastically altered
the practice of medicine but has raised a whole new set of
ethical dilemmas for physicians. In the past, many ethical
issues seemed to cross all boundaries of medicine. With the
advent of managed care, however, the ethical issues facing the
primary care physician may be much different than those facing
the specialist. For example, in the past cardiologists were
accused of financial conflict of interest when they “self-
referred” patients for a series of tests they performed, such as
stress testing, echocardiography, catheterization, and angio-
plasty. The dynamics of the emerging health care system,
especially capitation, however, has shifted the financial conflict
of interest back to the primary care physician, who may profit
or at least please his employer by restricting tests performed by
specialists. It is in the setting of dramatic changes in health care
such as these that the American College of Cardiology (ACC)
has organized this Bethesda Conference to review the ethical
dilemmas facing today’s cardiovascular specialists. This confer-
ence is divided into three task forces. Task Force 1 discusses
current external influences on the practice of cardiology. Task
Force 2 discusses ethical dilemmas surrounding end of life
decisions. Finally, Task Force 3 discusses clinical trial moni-
toring and ethical issues associated with the explosion of
scientific knowledge in molecular biology and genetics. Like its
predecessor, this conference on ethics cannot hope to address
all of the current ethical issues facing cardiovascular special-
ists. The focus on selected topics, however, will provide
valuable information to the reader in important areas.
This is the second Bethesda Conference on Ethics con-
ducted by the American College of Cardiology. The first was
held on October 5 to 6, 1989 and was subsequently published
in the Journal of the American College of Cardiology (1). It is
interesting to compare these two as a marker of changing
times. First of all, it is important to recognize that the major
goal of both conferences is to stimulate an increased interest
and focus on ethical issues in cardiovascular practice. In and of
itself, we hope that this heightened awareness will sensitize the
“ethical” physician to act appropriately. We assume that
physicians in general want to uphold the ideals of our profes-
sion. By understanding the issues, we are in a better position to
act.
The first ethics conference focused on three major issues: 1)
the relation of cardiovascular specialists to patients, other
physicians and physician-owned organizations; 2) perspectives
on the allocation of limited resources in cardiovascular medi-
cine; and 3) scientific responsibility and integrity in medical
research. Despite the differing topics of the two conferences,
five general perspectives on ethical issues in cardiovascular
medicine have not changed (1):
1. Cardiovascular physicians must recognize the central im-
portance of morals in health care delivery.
2. Cardiovascular physicians must recognize that value con-
flicts occur in the daily practice of clinical cardiology and
cardiovascular research and must be prepared to deal with
these conflicts in a fair, honest and consistent manner.
3. The cardiovascular physician must recognize the impor-
tance of the autonomy of the patient in health care decision
making, and that this may at times be in conflict with the
goal of achieving the best medical interests of the patient.
4. Cardiovascular physicians must be knowledgeable about
such ethical issues in health care as informed consent,
respect for persons, confidentiality and conflicts of interest.
5. The just allocation of health care resources requires the
cooperation of physician, patients, and society.
The first Bethesda Conference on Ethics concluded with a
series of case studies, which could form the basis for discussion
among a group of practitioners, cardiology fellows and faculty,
or other similar groups. Subsequent review at the annual
training program director’s meeting suggested that these cases
usefully formed the basis of many conferences for fellows in
cardiology training programs. Based on this previous experi-
ence, therefore, we have included a series of case studies at the
end of each task force report. It is hoped that these will
likewise be helpful as a basis for discussion of ethical dilemmas
at appropriate teaching conferences.
Ethical Issues in Managed Care
Managed care raises new ethical dilemmas for physicians
and requires reconsideration of existing dilemmas. Cardiolo-
gists in particular may face unprecedented ethical issues
because procedures such as echocardiography, catheterization,
or angioplasty are commonly subjected to utilization review
and practice guidelines. Authorization may be denied for
procedures that the cardiologist recommends. Also, beneficial
interventions such as tissue-type plasminogen activator for
acute myocardial infarction may not be considered as cost-
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effective as its less expensive alternative. Furthermore, al-
though managed care plans try to control unwarranted refer-
rals to specialists, recent studies suggest that the increased
access to the expertise of cardiologists is associated with
improved patient outcomes for patients with myocardial infarc-
tion and other problems (2–6). Finally, the public has become
concerned that financial incentives in managed care may create
conflicts of interest for physicians, leading doctors to deny
beneficial services that would be in the patient’s best interests.
Such public concerns have led to recent legislation to prohibit
gag rules, ensure reimbursement for emergency care, and
require disclosure of financial incentives and practice guide-
lines that might lead physicians to restrict indicated services.
Rationale for Managed Care
Managed care has grown because of the need to control
health care expenditures. National health expenditures were
$949.4 in 1994, or 13.7% of gross domestic product (GDP). In
1960 health expenditures consumed 5.1% of GDP; annual
percentage growth between 1960 and 1988 was 0.2 to 0.3%.
Between 1988 and 1992 annual percentage growth in health
expenditures as a portion of GDP exceeded 0.5%; in 1993
growth slowed to 0.3% and in 1994 0.1%, the result of an
accelerating economy and a slowing of growth in health care
expenditures (7). The United States spends more of its GDP
on health care than other countries that have comparable or
better health outcomes. Both private employers and public
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid insist on controlling
premiums to keep health insurance affordable. To achieve the
goal of restraining costs, managed care organizations may use
financial incentives, administrative measures such as utilization
review, practice guidelines, and authorization of referrals to
specialists by primary physicians; and organizational arrange-
ments such as restricted provider panels. Although these
measures can be justified because containing health care
expenditures is an important social goal, they may also raise
serious ethical concerns.
Reinterpretation of Ethical Guidelines
Under managed care, traditional ethical guidelines of re-
spect for patient autonomy, beneficence, and justice need to be
reconsidered and may require expansion or revision.
Autonomy. Respect for patient autonomy is the basis for
the legal doctrine of informed consent. Physicians must dis-
close information that is pertinent to the patient’s condition, so
that the patient can make informed choices about care.
Disclosure traditionally encompasses information about the
patient’s condition, the options for care, and the benefits, risks,
and consequences of each option. In the managed care era,
disclosure may need to be expanded to include other informa-
tion about potentially beneficial interventions that are not
covered by the plan. Recently enacted bans on “gag rules”
remove barriers to such disclosure by physicians. Similarly,
patients may need information about financial incentives and
about practice guidelines that may influence the physician’s
recommendations in order to make informed choices about
their care.
Beneficence. The guideline of beneficence enjoins physi-
cians to act in the best interests of their patients. As profes-
sionals, doctors are regarded as having a fiduciary obligation to
act in the best interests of their patients, not in their own
self-interest, the interests of the plan, or the interests of other
enrollees in the plan. This fiduciary obligation of physicians is
rooted in the vulnerability of patients when they are sick, the
discrepancy in expertise between physicians and patients, and
the difficulties patients may have in judging physicians’ recom-
mendations. This fiduciary duty to act in the patient’s interests
distinguishes the profession of medicine from a mere business.
With pressures for cost containment, the physician’s obli-
gation to act in the best interests of the patient may be more
important than ever. The physician may need to act as the
patient’s advocate in order to help the patient gain coverage
for interventions that are likely to prove beneficial in clinically
significant ways. The patient’s case may be a legitimate excep-
tion to practice guidelines. Or the patient may have a clear
indication for a nonformulary drug. In other cases, denial of
coverage may result from administrative delay or misunder-
standing. In such situations, the physician should be expected
to spend a reasonable amount of effort and time advocating on
behalf of patients.
Managed care, by making caregivers responsible for a
population of patients, creates opportunities to correct under-
utilization of interventions as well as overutilization. Many
effective interventions, such as angiotensin-converting enzyme
inhibitors, beta-adrenergic blocking agents and cholesterol
reduction after myocardial infarction, are utilized less often by
generalist physicians than by cardiology specialists (5). Cardi-
ologists can help develop innovative practices to disseminate
beneficial interventions more broadly, for example, by using
computerized medical records to identify patients who have
not received these beneficial interventions and by increasing
collaborative management of patients through mandated con-
sultations, informal consultations or case review by specialists.
As leaders of managed care organizations, physicians can also
promote such innovative practices by assuring that specialists
are compensated fairly for their efforts in identifying and
addressing underutilization of services.
Managed care, however, raises two concerns about benefi-
cence as an ethical guideline. First, do certain financial incen-
tives compromise the physician’s duty of beneficence? Finan-
cial incentives assume that physician behaviors are guided by
self-interest, at least when benefits to the patient are marginal.
Critics of managed care contend that some financial incentives
are inappropriate because they create an unacceptable likeli-
hood that physicians will withhold medically appropriate care.
For example, some incentives may place too much of the
physician’s income at risk, are tied too closely to individual
patient care decisions or fail to adjust for severity of illness.
Recent regulations by the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion (HCFA) regarding Medicare and Medicaid managed care
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plans identify bonus or withholding levels of 25% of potential
income as being sufficiently problematic to trigger require-
ments of satisfaction surveys of enrollees and stop-loss insur-
ance (8).
A second and more fundamental question is whether the
physician’s loyalty to the individual patient needs to be recon-
sidered. In managed care, capitated premiums establish a pool
of funds to provide health care services for all enrollees in the
plan. If funds from the capitation pool are spent on one
patient, they will not be available later for that patient or other
patients in the plan. Physicians have expertise regarding the
benefits and risks of medical interventions and make recom-
mendations to patients. If physicians take no responsibility for
restraining costs, the socially important goal of cost contain-
ment will fail or will be carried out in ways that fail to take into
account individual patient circumstances. Without physician
judgment in particular cases, restrictions on care will be meted
out by administrators with no clinical expertise. In this view,
given the importance of controlling the costs of health care,
physicians need to use their clinical judgment to implement
cost-containment measures. For these reasons, some argue
that the physician has an ethical duty to act as a steward, “a
person morally responsible for the careful use of money,
time . . . or other resources, especially with regard to the
principles or needs of a community or group” (9). The
physician would no longer act as the patient’s advocate if
evidence-based guidelines regarded the potential benefit to the
patient as clinically insignificant or extremely unlikely, or if the
patient had agreed on enrollment that interventions judged not
cost-effective would not be provided.
Critics object to the role of stewardship for physicians in
managed care. First, prudent patients and physicians have no
assurance that any savings in health care expenditures will
benefit patients, their families or others in the community.
Instead, savings may be dispensed as salaries for executives or
dividends to shareholders of for-profit plans. Second, the size
of the common resource pool can be increased. Some health
care plans spend 27% of premiums on administrative costs or
profits, whereas others spend only 5% on these items. Critics
contend that restrictions on care would not be required, or
would be less stringent, if administrative costs and profits were
reduced.
Justice. As an ethical guideline, distributive justice has
received relatively little attention in traditional clinical and
professional ethics. In the managed care era, considerations of
justice can no longer be ignored. Justice enjoins physicians to
allocate scarce medical resources in an equitable manner. As
already discussed, physicians need to use their expertise to help
fulfill the socially important goal of controlling the costs of
care. In allocating resources, justice or fairness requires that
patients who are similar in clinically and ethically relevant ways
should be treated similarly. Disturbingly, decisions by managed
care plans may be inconsistent. In disputed cases, insurance
plans may be more likely to authorize coverage when patients
are more persistent and knowledgeable in their demands. In
one noncardiac study, insurers varied considerably in their
willingness to cover autologous bone marrow transplantation
for patients with metastatic breast cancer (10). A single
insurance plan would make different coverage decisions for
clinically similar patients. Insurers were significantly more
likely to cover transplantation for patients who have a lawyer.
Such data suggest that although allocation decisions are inev-
itable, they need to be made on a more equitable basis.
Reassessment of Professionalism
In response to changes brought about by managed care,
individual physicians and professional organizations can play
an important role in resolving new ethical dilemmas.
Physicians should serve as patient advocates when a man-
aged care organization does not authorize interventions that
are likely to provide significant clinical or functional benefits
for a patient. Under these circumstances, physicians need to
reaffirm their ethical duty to act in the best interests of the
patient, regardless of any financial or other incentives. General
practice guidelines cannot take into account individual circum-
stances that make a particular case a legitimate exception.
Because of their clinical expertise and judgment, physicians are
in a unique position to determine whether a particular case is
an exception to practice guidelines. Physicians should inform
patients of such beneficial interventions, whether or not the
insurance plan would cover them. Without such information,
patients cannot decide to appeal the coverage decision or pay
for an intervention out of pocket. If an exception is justified,
physicians should be forceful advocates for patients and try to
convince the insurance plan to cover the intervention (11). On
the other hand, physicians should not advocate for patients
when interventions are only marginally beneficial and an
exception to the guidelines is not justified, but should explain
to the patient why the intervention is not recommended at this
time.
Physicians can help ensure that managed care institutions
are ethically responsible. It makes little sense to hold physi-
cians to ethical responsibilities without giving attention to the
responsibilities of managed care organizations that constrain
and influence the actions of individual doctors. If the organi-
zational context is not ethically sound, physicians may be
placed in the bind of having ethical and professional respon-
sibilities that are extremely difficult to carry out.
Physicians and professional societies can help managed
care organizations establish practice guidelines and standards
for utilization review. Physicians can help evaluate published
studies critically and provide expert judgments. Professional
organizations like the ACC can play an important role in
recommending practice guidelines, particularly as new knowl-
edge about cardiology procedures is published. When devel-
oping such guidelines, physicians need to recognize their own
self-interest in obtaining greater insurance coverage and com-
pensation for their services. Because of such conflicts of
interest, physicians need to adopt procedures to enhance
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impartiality of deliberations and ensure that guidelines are
based on rigorous evidence.
Physicians have responsibility for financial incentives and
utilization review within independent practice association
(IPA)-model health maintenance organizations (HMOs), in
which multispecialty physician groups assume financial risk
and organize the delivery of care. Some financial incentives
may be too powerful, and some utilization review procedures
may be too restrictive, creating an unacceptable risk that
appropriate care will be denied. Some organizations may
schedule patients so tightly that physicians have no real
opportunity to discuss options for care with patients or to serve
as patient advocates when coverage for beneficial care is
denied. Multispecialty physician groups often adopt the same
types of financial incentives and utilization review procedures
as managed care plans themselves (12). Thus, physicians who
complain that some incentives and utilization review under-
mine their professional integrity need to accept the challenge
of helping to devise better ways of achieving the goals of
cost-effective, coordinated care.
In summary, managed care raises important new ethical
issues for all physicians, particularly cardiologists. Physicians
can play an important role in resolving these dilemmas as
clinicians and leaders in health care organizations and as
members of professional societies.
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TASK FORCES
Task Force 1: External Influences on the Practice of Cardiology
JAMES S. FORRESTER, MD, FACC, J. WARD KENNEDY, MD, FACC, CO-CHAIR,
SYLVAN LEE WEINBERG, MD, FACC, CO-CHAIR
The core values of the medical profession are being decided not
by physicians and surgeons acting through medical societies, but
by lawyers and judges taking action in courtrooms and by
managed care administrators overriding the decisions of trained
medical professionals in response to the imperatives of com-
modified medicine. American medicine is in crisis (1).
Introduction
Central to the relationship of the cardiologist to society is a
covenant—the unique interaction between the doctor and the
patient. The covenant derives from the patient’s reliance not
only on the physician’s scientific competence, but also on the
physician’s commitment to act in the patient’s best interest
regardless of financial concerns or other pressures. To this
relationship physicians must bring the virtues of trustworthi-
ness, integrity, humility, patient advocacy, compassion, wis-
dom, prudence and effacement of self-interest. The impor-
tance of the covenant was stated by the late Cardinal Bernadin
(2) before the American Medical Association House of Dele-
gates in December 1995, shortly before his death:
The “covenant” is grounded in the moral obligations that arise
from the nature of the doctor-patient relationship. They are
moral obligations—as opposed to legal or contractual obliga-
tions—because they are based on fundamental human concepts
of right and wrong. While it is not currently fashionable to think
of medicine in terms of morality, morality is, in fact, the core of
the doctor-patient relationship and the foundation of the
medical profession. Why do I insist on a moral model as
opposed to the economic and contractual models now in vogue?
Allow me to describe four key aspects of medicine that give it
a moral status and establish a covenantal relationship:
First, the reliance of the patient on the doctor. Illness
compels a patient to place his or her fate in the hands of a
doctor. A patient relies not only on the technical competence of
a doctor, but also on his or her moral compass, on the doctor’s
commitment to put the interests of the patient first.
Second, the holistic character of medical decisions. A
physician is a scientist and a clinician but as a doctor, is and
must be, more. A doctor is and must be a caretaker of the
patient’s person, integrating medical realities into the whole of
the patient’s life. A patient looks to his or her doctor as a
professional adviser, a guide through some of life’s most
difficult journeys.
Third, the social investment in medicine. The power of
modern medicine—of each and every doctor—is the result of
centuries of science, clinical trials, and public and private
investments. Above all, medical science has succeeded because
of the faith of people in medicine and in doctors. This faith
creates a social debt and is the basis of medicine’s call—its
vocation—to serve the common good.
Fourth, the personal commitments of doctors. The relation-
ship with a patient creates an immediate, personal, nontrans-
ferable fiduciary responsibility to protect that patient’s best
interests. Regardless of markets, government programs, or
network managers, patients depend on doctors for a personal
commitment and for advocacy through an increasingly complex
and impersonal system. This moral center of the doctor-patient
relationship is the very essence of being a doctor. It also defines
the outlines of the covenant that exists between physicians and
their patients, their profession, and their society. The covenant
is a promise that the profession makes, a solemn promise—that
it is and will remain true to its moral center. In individual terms,
the covenant is the basis on which patients trust their doctors.
In social terms, the covenant is the grounds for the public’s
continued respect and reliance on the profession of medicine.
The 29th Bethesda Conference recognized that the emer-
gence of managed care* has created a new set of ethical
dilemmas which must be addressed thoughtfully. Central to
these new ethical dilemmas is a new principle. Society looks to
physicians to conserve financial resources, while simulta-
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neously serving as an advocate for individual patients. The
challenge that managed care creates for the ethical physician
reflects the vast difference that exists in the ethics of the
marketplace, and that of the bedside. For example, the physi-
cian dealing with a patient on a “one on one” basis finds that
some aspects of managed care, and some purveyors of this
form of health care delivery, confound the fundamental pre-
cepts of patient autonomy, justice, beneficence, nonmalefi-
cence, truth-telling, and fidelity (3). This Task Force report
explores concerns about these external influences that threaten
the ethical principles on which society’s trust in physicians is
based. Failure of physicians to act according to “a code of
ethics that recognizes the primacy of the patient’s interests
risks the loss of public trust, which may cost professional
autonomy. The danger then is that ethical dilemmas will be
settled by rules rather than by judgments” (4).
The 29th Bethesda Conference discussed how the ethics of
medical practice can be reconciled with those of the business
world, particularly those of managed care. The central conclu-
sion of the Bethesda Conference is that there must be a
national debate on how society wishes to allocate medical care
in order to preserve financial resources. The debate creates the
need for a clearly defined code of ethics for all health care
providers in the era of managed care.
The Relationship of Medical and
Business Ethics
Business ethics dates to early commerce (5–7). Capitalism,
founded upon the theories of Adam Smith in the 18th century
(7,8), has historically been motivated by the preeminence of
profit generation within a free market system (5,6,9). This
principle holds that the primary purpose of a corporation is to
maximize financial performance and that business organiza-
tions must honor this primary fiduciary duty. The dominance of
profit over other business goals is now being widely challenged
as an insufficient mission for a business organization (9).
Ethical codes have been developed by corporations (7), and
the definition of business ethics has been expanded. Business
ethics has become “the study of business action—individual or
corporate—with special attention to its moral adequacy” (7).
In the business world, health care is unique because the
consumer—the patient—is highly vulnerable and is easily
exploited as a result of loss of health, lack of knowledge, and
financial jeopardy. It is therefore crucial that business ethics in
health care incorporate those ethical principles that preserve
patients’ rights: beneficence, nonmaleficence of patient auton-
omy, and justice (10). These are the same ethical principles to
which physicians must adhere. The mutual acceptance of the
principle that there must be no difference between the ethics of
health care business and medicine would have a profound
influence on the actions and behavior of all those involved in
the business of health care in any capacity. But within the
business of health care, the acceptance of these principles has
not yet occurred or at best is in its infancy (11). This was a
matter of critical concern to the Bethesda Conference.
The Advantages and Limitations of Managed
Health Care Systems
Although managed care may theoretically enhance the
value of health care through the close integration of the
financing and delivery of health care (12,13), it has significantly
complicated, and in some cases initiated, the patient-physician
relationship (13–16). As a business solution to a social issue,
for-profit managed care is driven by the capitalistic forces of
the marketplace (17). In consequence, some systems of man-
aged care cause division of physician loyalties between the
patient and the business organization controlling the financial
and professional relationships (11). For instance, financial
incentives, disincentives, and other hidden relationships, are
successful in modifying physician behavior in ways that may not
be in the patient’s interest (11,18).
In this new era of medicine, physicians in both fee-for-
service and managed care systems have instituted changes in
practice to reduce the overall cost of hospital care. The
changes in health care have both benefits and limitations.
Some remarkable benefits have been achieved as a result of the
pressures from managed care (Table 1).
Physicians also have taken the initiative in the development
of practice guidelines. The American College of Cardiology
(ACC), for instance, has published over 18 Practice Guidelines
and Expert Consensus Statements dealing with cardiologic
practice since 1990. These treatment pathways specify optimal
care, and in the best of circumstances, reduce the length of
hospital stay by both improving the quality and reducing the
variability of care.
Ethical Dilemmas Created by Managed Care
Of greatest concern to the Bethesda Conference Task
Force 1 is the threat of managed care to the ethical founda-
tions of the medical profession. The ethical conflicts created by
the mandate to reduce the cost of patient care fall into four
broad categories (Table 2): denial of care; financial incentives
and disincentives to limit care; withholding of information
from patients; and coercive practices designed to limit care.
One way to understand and resolve these conflicts is through
development of a code of ethics. Although no such code exists
Table 1. Benefits Achieved by Pressures to Reduce Health
Care Costs
Attention to cost and reduction of waste and redundancy
Better coordinated care
Focus on health promotion and disease prevention
Development of methods to measure quality of care
Lower hospitalization rates
Increased use of outpatient procedures
Heavy investment in information systems
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for managed care, the courts have provided a potential societal
view on the ethical issues through judicial rulings in which the
ethical dilemma was a central issue. In this section, we will
describe ethical conflicts, using case examples that resulted in
rulings that clarify the appropriate action expected of physi-
cians.
Denial of Appropriate Care
In certain managed care models physicians are required to
seek prior authorization for expensive medical and surgical
interventions. The managed care organization (MCO) may
deny authorization in accordance with unilaterally established
criteria to which the physician has no access. Thus, a medical
decision is made by an individual not directly involved in the
patient’s care. This financially motivated denial of care is a
threat to the ethical principles of beneficence and nonmalefi-
cence, and to patient and physician autonomy. This type of
decision ignores the moral covenant described by Cardinal
Bernadin. The ethical dilemma is created when a physician is
asked to accept a medical decision, potentially adverse to the
patient’s interest, which may be based, at least in part, on the
financial interest of the insurer.
A landmark case illustrating the potential ethical dilemma
of denial of care involved a forty-year old woman who was
approved for a 10-day hospitalization for placement of an
abdominal vascular prosthesis (19). In the postoperative pe-
riod, the graft occluded, necessitating additional surgery and
prolongation of her hospitalization. Based on the postopera-
tive complication, the patient’s surgeons filed a request for an
eight-day extension. Her third-party payer, however, approved
only four days of additional hospitalization. Consequently, her
physicians discharged her early. Out of the hospital, the
patient’s graft again failed, leading to an above-knee amputa-
tion. This case illustrates multiple and complex ethical issues,
including the physician’s obligation of beneficence and non-
maleficence, and the patient’s right of autonomy. In a subse-
quent lawsuit the court gave its view of this ethical dilemma in
unequivocal terms:
The physician who complies without protest with the limitations
imposed by a third party payor, when his medical judgment
dictates otherwise, cannot avoid the ultimate responsibility for
his patient’s care. He cannot point to the health care payer as
the liability scapegoat when the consequences of his own
determinative medical decisions go sour (19).
This decision is consistent with a long history of American
common law. This 29th Bethesda Conference concurs that the
principle of beneficence unequivocally establishes that physi-
cians must be their patient’s advocate, consistent with their
medical judgment, and that this principle must retain highest
priority.
Financial Incentives to Withhold Access to
Appropriate Care
Since World War II medical progress, exemplified by a 40%
to 50% reduction in age-adjusted cardiovascular mortality
(20), has come largely from the specialties. Specialists now
comprise 70% of American doctors. Limiting access to special-
ists and restraining their use of expensive technology is an
important strategy for reducing MCO costs (21,22). Fre-
quently, the mechanism of limitation of specialty care comes
through use of a “gatekeeper” primary care physician who
receives a financial incentive to limit specialty referrals.
A fundamental ethical tenet of medical practice articulated
in antiquity by Hippocrates and Maimonides, and most re-
cently expressed by the American Medical Association (AMA)
Council on Ethics and Judicial Affairs, is that physicians have
a fiduciary responsibility that prohibits them from placing their
own financial interest above the welfare of their patients (23).
The potential for violation of this tenet clearly exists in both
fee-for-service medicine and managed care, but the nature of
the problem is quite different. In fee-for-service medicine there
is the possibility of providing excessive care which can cause
harm as well as waste valuable resources. There is no doubt
that some doctors have been guilty of such practices. However,
these practices are clearly in violation of the AMA ethical code
of organized medicine and the oath which the physician has
taken.
An equally serious problem is financial incentives designed
to limit the use of appropriate expensive diagnostic and
therapeutic modalities. Used by many MCOs, financial incen-
tives are designed to reduce cost through reduction of medical
diagnostic and therapeutic services. Without question, this
practice has resulted in adverse patient outcomes. In addition,
disincentives may include reduced reimbursement or contract
termination for what the MCO deems to be excessive numbers
Table 2. Practices That May Create Ethical Conflicts in
Patient Care
Denial of care
Requirement that physicians must have their decisions approved by an
individual or entity not involved in the patient’s care
Refusal to provide care because it is extremely costly
Financial incentives and disincentives
Reduced payment for care until the end of the year
Year-end bonuses for limiting the total cost of care
A fund allocated for specific services; the pool decreases each time it is
used
Withholding information
Failure to disclose enrollee (coverage) or patient treatment options
Failure to disclose financial arrangements adverse to patient’s interest
Failure to disclose options available to patients receiving inadequate care
“Gag clauses” that prohibit open discussion between physician and patient
Coercive practices designed to limit care
Monitoring referrals, then inducing physicians to provide care for which
they are not qualified
Limitation of primary care physician’s capacity to refer patients to qualified
specialists
Nonrenewal of a physician contract based on financial rather than medical
performance
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of hospitalizations, excessive lengths of stay, or excessive
referrals to specialists. Doctors subjected to such pressures
over a protracted period of time may unwittingly modify their
medical decisions without even realizing that they are no
longer acting in the interest of their patients but in their own
self-interest (17).
The most widely publicized case involving the ethics of an
incentive to withhold care occurred in Southern California,
when a thirty-five year old woman visited her primary care
physician with a chief complaint of severe abdominal and
rectal pain (24). Based on the clinical presentation and his
physical examination, the physician diagnosed peptic ulcer.
The patient did not improve on appropriate ulcer therapy. She
returned several times, complaining of worsening symptoms.
For approximately three months, despite her continuing severe
pain, the physician refused to do additional tests or refer her to
a specialist. After repeated requests from the woman and her
husband, the physician referred the woman to a specialist.
Within a few days, she was found to have widely metastatic
colon carcinoma. In the jury trial that followed her death, the
family argued that the physician’s MCO contract encouraged
the doctor and his group to limit both referrals and diagnostic
tests. Further, the family alleged that the physician had failed
to disclose these incentives. In his testimony the physician
conceded that reduction in referrals to medical specialists
increased the income to his medical group. The jury found for
the plaintiff. As with other ethical issues in medicine, there is
no consensus on the meaning of this important case. From a
number of similar cases, however, it seems apparent that some
juries have a clear perception of the physician’s ethical fidu-
ciary responsibility. Such decisions suggest that juries are
unlikely to accept incentives designed to restrict a patient’s
access to appropriate care when that decision violates patient
autonomy and results in an adverse patient outcome.
Physicians also face powerful disincentives. Although “gag
clauses” which prohibit doctors from discussing forms of
treatment not available or not covered by a given contract have
been outlawed, both by federal legislation and many state
legislatures, nonetheless subtle disincentives still exist. These
negative incentives include termination without a defined
cause or due process. Personal financial incentives and disin-
centives threaten multiple ethical principles, and create con-
flicts of interest and moral dilemmas.
It should be pointed out that not all financial incentives are
adverse to patient care. For instance, incentives can be struc-
tured so that the revenues they create are reinvested in other
aspects of care, e.g., better medical equipment or medical
libraries. When employed, therefore, financial incentives
should be oriented toward reducing costs and improving
quality of care.
This Bethesda Conference concludes that financial incen-
tives have the potential to violate both the ethical principle of
patient autonomy and the moral values inherent in physician
integrity. Therefore, financial incentives must be disclosed.
The Legal Shield for Unethical Medical
Business Practices: ERISA
To be effective, an ethical code must be enforceable when
violation occurs. One federal law, unrelated to medical care at
the time it was written, has had major impact on attempts to
resolve the ethical issues created by the emergence of managed
care. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) passed by Congress in 1974 governs employee benefit
plans. Initially the plan was designed to protect pensions. As
written, however, the law is applicable to self-insured health
plans offered by employers to their employees. When an MCO
refuses to precertify payment for necessary medical services,
courts have held that the action is covered under the federal
law preempting any state laws governing employee health
plans. Whereas restriction of access to a specialist by a primary
care physician resulted in the malpractice judgment in the
preceding case example, similar restriction of referrals by
MCOs generally does not result in parallel liability. One
example is the case of a middle-aged man who sustained a
large myocardial infarction in a midwestern city (25). In the
recovery period based on inducible ventricular tachycardia
which placed the patient “at high risk for sudden death,” his
cardiologist determined that the patient required electrophysi-
ologically guided left ventricular aneurysmectomy. Because the
local hospitals did not perform this procedure, the cardiologist
concluded that his patient’s best chance for survival lay in
referral to Barnes Hospital in St. Louis. The surgeons were
contacted and arrangements were made for his surgery. Be-
cause St. Louis lay outside its service area, however, Lincoln
National Health Plan refused to pre-certify payment. After a
substantial delay, a second plan-retained cardiologist evalu-
ated the patient. This consultant agreed that the patient should
be transferred to Barnes, 4 months after the original recom-
mendation. In that period, however, his cardiac function had
further deteriorated, precluding the possibility of surgical
repair. He was put on a cardiac transplantation list, but died
three months later while awaiting a suitable heart. The pa-
tient’s family sued. The court held that when the proposed
surgery was canceled in response to the Lincoln National
refusal to certify payment, it was not providing the patient with
medical advice and could not be liable for medical malpractice.
The decision in this case was based upon the ERISA
exemption. Thus, the courts have typically found that denial of
care is an insurance benefit decision. The remarkable outcome
of this reasoning is that the liability of the MCO is limited to
payment of the cost of denied insurance benefit, whereas the
physician remains liable for both improper treatment and for
additional punitive damages for willful disregard of the pa-
tient’s interest. ERISA, therefore, creates a unique dichotomy
in which the physician may assume the liability for a plan’s
decision with which he or she does not agree, while the plan’s
nonphysician decision maker is protected from liability. The
Bethesda Conference concluded that the ERISA preemption
negatively impacts the attempt to develop an ethical code and
must be modified to meet the emergence of managed care.
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The Impact of Managed Care Practices on
Physician and Patient Attitudes
Many managed health care plans put substantial pressure
on physicians to limit the time spent with an individual patient,
making it difficult to provide considerate, thoughtful and
ethical care. The patient is therefore often not informed about
the rationale for various tests and procedures, and their outcome.
Working under these stressful conditions has resulted in unprec-
edented physician dissatisfaction with their professional life and
even with their choice of profession. The dissatisfaction relates to
both ethical and financial issues. A mail poll of 1,141 California
physicians under the age of 40 (26) revealed that one third of
these young physicians would not choose to enter medicine again.
A vast majority were dissatisfied with their relationships with
MCOs and 72% indicated that their patient care decisions were
influenced by reimbursement or capitation issues (59% some-
times, 20% frequently). They also reported that 53% of their
patients believe that treatment decisions are influenced too
heavily by reimbursement considerations.
Similar levels of dissatisfaction with managed care have
recently been reported in surveys of patients. In the most
comprehensive evaluation yet undertaken in California, re-
searchers at the University of California at Berkeley (UC
Berkeley) and the Field Research Corporation surveyed 1,200
patients (27). Only 3% of Californians with private medical
coverage have traditional fee-for-service plans, so the results
deal almost exclusively with managed care. Forty-two percent
of the individuals surveyed reported problems with managed
care, involving denial or delays in getting medical treatment,
inappropriate care, or difficulty in getting referrals to physician
specialists. Projecting from the 21% of the patients who
reported that their medical condition had worsened as a result
of these problems, the survey estimated that approximately 1.4
million people in California were adversely affected by these
managed care practices. The California survey was the second
recent survey to find significant patient dissatisfaction with
managed care. A study by Harvard University researchers and
the Kaiser Family Foundation found that 51% of Americans
believed that managed care had lowered the quality of medical
care, compared to 32% who said it had improved the quality (27).
The UC Berkeley-Field study was commissioned by Cali-
fornia Governor Pete Wilson as part of the preparation for
comprehensive recommendations on health care reform. An
additional key finding of the survey was that consumers
reported varying levels of satisfaction depending on the type of
managed care plan to which they belonged. Patients enrolled
in group/staff model not-for-profit health maintenance organi-
zations (HMOs) (the Kaiser Foundation accounts for nearly all
such members in California) were the most satisfied. In
contrast, only 29% in network or independent practice associ-
ation (IPA) model HMOs (the great majority of California
HMOs) were “very satisfied.” The relative satisfaction that
physicians experience with their professional lives is of great
importance, for it is difficult to envision a disgruntled physician
providing thoughtful, high quality and optimistic medical care.
Methods for Dealing With the New
Ethical Problems
The simplest approach to the ethical dilemmas posed by
managed care is public education. Many have argued that with
the emergence of managed care, the purchaser of health care,
be it an individual or a corporation, has the same responsibility
for due diligence that exists in any other business transaction.
For instance, the ethical dilemmas have been made explicit in
a spectrum of “buyer beware” warnings from consumer advo-
cates and health care attorneys. One such compendium enti-
tled “Questions for Employers and Patients to Ask Before
They Join an HMO,” circulated by California health care
attorney Mark Hiepler is shown in modified form in Table 3
(28).
It seems clear that these questions are predominantly the
counterpart of the ethical conflicts identified in Table 2.
Nonetheless, the appropriate answer may not be clear, even to
a reasonably well informed purchaser. A more serious problem
in the “buyer beware” strategy is that the patient is extraordi-
narily vulnerable, both by lack of knowledge, urgency of
circumstances and the emotional stress of illness. This is a
particular concern for the aging Medicare patient who is
offered medical coverage by MCOs at low cost, often with free
prescription drugs. Although such plans may appear very
attractive at the time, they may not provide the coverage which
meets the medical needs of the patient. Leaving these deci-
sions up to the individual patient may be a disservice to many
older and/or poorly educated individuals. The Bethesda Con-
ference concluded that this approach is inadequate as a
stand-alone strategy.
An alternative approach is legislation. In November 1997
President Clinton’s Advisory Commission on Protection and
Quality in the Health Care Industry published its recommen-
dations for consumer rights and responsibilities in the health
care industry. These recommendations have been made avail-
able on the Internet (http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov/
cborr/consbil.htm). The eight major categories of rights and
responsibilities are summarized in Table 4.
From the section titles of the Consumer Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities, it is apparent that the Advisory Commission
has set out to legislate an ethical code for the health care
industry, applicable to both fee-for-service and managed care
medicine. The Bethesda Conference strongly supports the
Table 3. Questions for Employers and Patients to Ask Before They
Join a Health Maintenance Organization
1. Do primary care doctors get more money if they deny referrals to
specialists or hospitals?
2. Does the HMO contract allow termination if it believes the doctor is
overutilizing services?
3. Does the plan have an “experimental/investigative” or “not medically
necessary” exclusion?
4. What are the most frequently denied procedures by the HMO using this
criterion?
HMO 5 health maintenance organization.
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principles expressed in this document. Nonetheless, the Con-
ference also concludes that legislation alone will not eliminate
the need for a code of ethics.
Development of a Code of Medical Business Ethics
in the Managed Care Era
Professions are founded on ethical values (29). In the
medical profession, these values develop trust, based on the
primacy of the patient’s interest. When asked or forced to do
something he/she feels is not in the patient’s interest, the
physician is asked to deny his/her professional and personal
integrity. In the view of some, professionalism is under attack.
The Chief Medical Officer of United Health Care has stated
“patients and health care purchasers are challenging the
effectiveness of professionalism.” He contends that it is up to
managed care to test and measure competency and whether
the patient’s best interest is being served. In this view, “pro-
fessionalism” cannot be relied upon to accomplish this goal
(30). The problem created by the transfer of medical decisions
from the attending physician to a remote corporate location is
the absence of a code of ethics governing the new decision-
maker. The specific problem has recently led to a call for
development of a uniform code of medical ethics in Great
Britain (31). The Bethesda Conference concluded there is a
need for a national dialog directed at development of consen-
sus on a managed care code of ethics.
The American Association of Health Plans has recognized
that the managed care industry does not have a defined
standard of ethics that deals with the new ethical problems
created by managed care practices. Medical ethicist Bradford
H. Gray states that even among nonprofit plans of high repute,
there is no defined standard of ethics (32). As a consequence,
physicians working under managed care may not have the
capacity or the motivation to act as advocates for patients (33).
Further, there is no ready system for monitoring the quality of
medical care, in particular underutilization caused by MCOs.
In the face of widespread concern about the ethics of
managed care, ICOs and consumer groups have begun a dialog
(34). Some organizations such as the National Committee for
Quality Assurance have begun to develop methods to measure
clinical effectiveness in both MCOs and fee-for-service sys-
tems. Use of beta-blockers after myocardial infarction, annual
eye examinations in diabetes, and treatment for patients with
hyperlipidemia are among the surrogates used to measure
quality of care. Methods of evaluating the quality of medical
care provided to patients with complex conditions such as
congestive heart failure, however, have not yet been devel-
oped. In the absence of effective measures of quality, most
organizations have to rely on simple measurements such as
length of hospital stay and hospital mortality. The develop-
ment of reliable and reproducible measures of outcome is
essential to evaluate the quality of care provided to our
patients. There are now several recent studies that document
that care provided by cardiologists for the management of
acute myocardial infarction is superior to that provided by
general physicians (20,35,36). There must also be less complex
conditions that can be equally well cared for by general
physicians at potentially lower cost. In considering the long-
term outlook for managed care, Health Care International
warns that practices which save costs in the short term may
prove untenable in the long term (32). This admonition may be
interpreted to mean that the long-term consequences of cost
saving through delaying and denying sophisticated and expen-
sive medical services may have unfavorable implications which
are, as yet, not apparent.
The Bethesda Conference concluded that unilateral at-
tempts by MCOs or by legislatures are unlikely to develop a
useful code of medical ethics. There needs to be a preceding
dialog on whether, and how much, the nation now wishes to
restrain the cost of medical care, recognizing there are poten-
tial adverse consequences for some patients. Only with the
establishment of a code of managed care ethics can physicians
in such systems be stewards of society’s resources and patient
advocates.
Conclusion
The Bethesda Conference consensus is that a substantial
decline in ethical medical practice has accompanied the devel-
opment of methods to reduce health care cost. To maintain the
integrity of the medical profession it is essential to reverse this
trend. The ethical principles and the moral values traditionally
held by physicians, however, are not physician specific. All
those involved in health care in any capacity must act with the
highest personal and professional integrity. Since all members
of health care organizations are responsible for the profes-
sional status of health care, any action, policy or contract
formulation or patient contact should conform to these ethical
principles (18).
Physicians in particular are at risk of subjugating their basic
ethical ideals, compromising the patient-physician relationship
for financial and other business reasons, and losing the profes-
sional status granted by society (11). The challenge for physi-
cians is to return to the ideals of the medical profession; care
of the sick and relief of their suffering within the structure of
the moral physician-patient covenant (37). Beyond the physi-
cians’ awareness of their unique role in society, physicians must
also recognize the uniqueness of the business of health care
(11) and be proactively involved in defining the mission,
strategies, goals and cultures of health care organizations.
Table 4. Consumer Rights and Responsibilities
Information disclosure
Choice of providers and plans
Access to emergency services
Participation in treatment decisions
Respect and nondiscrimination
Confidentiality of health information
Complaints and appeals
Consumer responsibilities
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Finally, they must advocate a national dialog on the often
conflicting mandates to reduce the cost of health and to
provide the best care for their patients. The central question
that must be debated is whether the historic moral covenant
will be changed to an economic/contractual arrangement
whereby physicians are reduced to mere managers of commer-
cial and societal resources (38). In this dialog, physicians must
maintain their role of patient advocate.
In summary, the challenge to physicians is to clearly artic-
ulate the ethical code of medicine. The challenge to MCOs is
to actively direct the organization toward greater enlightened
social responsibility. It is only through the acceptance of these
ethical principles that the highest quality of patient care will be
attained and made universally available to all members of
society.
Bethesda Conference Recommendations
Each of the recommendations were voted on by the Be-
thesda Conference attendees. All received a majority vote of
.75%.
1. Establishing a national dialog on ethical standards through-
out the health care system. Health care providers need to
develop a consensus on medical ethics. Only when princi-
ples are agreed upon, can physicians take responsibility for
being both the patient advocate and the steward of society’s
resources.
2. Stipulating that the code of ethics applies to physicians,
hospital administrators, managed care executives, medical
directors and all those involved directly or indirectly with
patient care.
3. Redirecting financial incentives from withholding care to
improving care.
4. Requiring full disclosure of the mechanism, distribution and
actual dollar amounts of financial incentives and disincen-
tives offered to physicians.
5. Requiring an independent expedited appeals process to
resolve patient disputes.
6. Protecting physicians against sanctions when they appeal
medical decisions on their patients’ behalf.
7. Requiring full disclosure of medical services that are cov-
ered and those that are excluded.
8. Confirming the patient’s right to direct access to reasonable
specialty care.
Appendix
Case Studies for Task Force 1
Case 1. An asymptomatic 46-year old man in a “gatekeeper” HMO
has severe mitral valve prolapse involving both valve leaflets. His
annual transthoracic echocardiogram shows an increase in end-
diastolic left ventricular (LV) diameter from 4.8 cm to 5.8 cm and after
discussion with his family physician he is referred by his cardiologist for
consideration of surgery to prevent irreversible deterioration of LV
function. The surgeon requests a transesophageal echocardiogram (to
assess the likelihood of valve repair vs. replacement so that these
possibilities can be discussed with the patient), as well as a cardiac
catheterization and coronary angiography. The cardiologist and the
surgeon are informed by the family physician that permission for these
studies has been denied because they are not necessary; an operation
is appropriate even if valve replacement proves necessary, and cathe-
terization is unlikely to alter the patient’s management.
Will this scenario become more common in an era of managed care
and/or limited resources? How should the cardiologist and surgeon
react to these alterations in their routine for preoperative evaluation?
What should they tell the patient? What should they tell the family
physician? Do they have a responsibility to conserve resources (“stew-
ardship”), that must be weighed against their responsibility to do the
utmost good for the patient (“beneficence”)? For example, should they
consider it sufficient if the patient has a negative thallium stress test?
Case 2. A physician in a multihospital MCO develops methodology
that improves outcome in patients with AIDS. The corporate market-
ing division reports that release of this information is likely to
substantially increase the number of AIDS patients that enroll in the
MCO, and thereby significantly reduce profit margin.
Do medical ethics require that the MCO institute the improved
methodology throughout the health care system, even though profits
will suffer, and must the information be made available to the public?
Case 3. A physician vigorously disagrees with the hospital phar-
macy and therapeutics committee’s decision regarding a very costly
new therapy. The decision will deny therapy to her patient. The
decision of the committee is clearly influenced, at least in part, by
financial consideration.
Is the physician ethically obliged to challenge the decision? If the
physician carries her concern to the local newspaper, should she be
punished by the organization?
Case 4. A 55-year old businessman is admitted for relatively
asymptomatic recurrent atrial fibrillation. He is found at echocardiog-
raphy to have segmental ventricular dysfunction. Cardiac catheteriza-
tion revealed severe triple-vessel obstructive coronary disease requir-
ing bypass surgery. This unexpected development, as might be
anticipated, caused the patient great emotional distress. However, he
agreed to have bypass surgery the following day. The managed care
organization who provided his coverage, upon learning of the sched-
uled surgery, insisted that the patient be transferred to another
hospital with which it had a contract for cardiac surgery. This would
have required the patient, already under great duress, to be transferred
to another hospital with cardiologists and cardiac surgeons unknown to
him. The patient objected vehemently to being transferred. The MCO
refused to discuss the matter with the attending cardiologist, but
insisted on the transfer.
Should the patient’s cardiologist transfer the patient as directed by
the MCO? Should the cardiologist, feeling that the stress imposed by
transfer would be potentially dangerous to his patient, insist that the
surgery be done as scheduled? Does the MCO have a moral and
ethical responsibility to consider the extenuating circumstances and
bend its policy in this instance for the good of the patient? Is an
exclusive contract by an MCO with a specific hospital in a given city
with other institutions of comparable quality in itself ethical?
Case 5. A cardiologist is treating a patient with advanced coronary
disease with a lipid-lowering agent, a beta-blocker and an angiotensin-
converting enzyme inhibitor. The patient is controlled effectively and
tolerates the medications well. The cardiologist receives a communi-
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cation from a pharmaceutical distribution company under contract to
or owned by the MCO to which the patient belongs. The cardiologist
is requested to change the medications to similar but somewhat
different products.
Is it ethical for the MCO through its pharmaceutical distribution
company to make such a request? Should the cardiologist accede to
the request knowing that there are nuances of difference between the
medications involved; perhaps difference is in the patient’s tolerance
and perhaps some psychological reluctance on the part of the patient
to make the change?
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Task Force 2: Application of Medical and Surgical Interventions
Near the End of Life
SPENCER B. KING III, MD, FACC, CO-CHAIR, DANIEL J. ULLYOT, MD, FACC, CO-CHAIR,
LOFTY BASTA, MD, FACC, FRCP, FCCP, FACA, ALFRED A. BOVE, MD, PHD, FACC,
C. RICHARD CONTI, MD, FACC, ALBERT H. JENEMANN, SJ, PHD,
PETER A. SINGER, MD, MPH, FRCPC
Introduction
Improved technology and an aging population cause physi-
cians and particularly cardiovascular specialists to be increas-
ingly confronted with decisions about the application of com-
plex, sophisticated, and often expensive technology in end-of-
life situations. “End-of-life” is defined for purposes of this
discussion as applying to critically ill persons whose survival is
in doubt, whose anticipated survival is severely limited, and to
the chronically ill whose prognosis is similarly limited.
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The level of health care spending is a function of national
wealth and societies’ willingness to allocate resources to the
health care sector. As society seeks to constrain costs of
medical care, the expenditure of resources in end-of-life
situations becomes a particularly inviting target for cost sav-
ings, and intensifies the ethical issues surrounding this vulner-
able subset of patients. “Advance care directives,” “do not
resuscitate orders,” “comfort care,” “futile care,” and
“physician-assisted suicide” are terms which suggest the need
for a particular ethical sensitivity lest these become a coercion
for patients, families, and physicians to capitulate to the
economic forces driving contemporary medical practice.
The ethic of distributive justice is referred to in the 21st
Bethesda Conference “Ethics in Cardiovascular Medicine.”
“In the context of limited resources and continually expanding
technology, physicians and institutions face increasingly diffi-
cult decisions as they attempt to use available medical re-
sources in a technically and ethically justifiable way to ensure
appropriate care for patients” (1).
Distributive justice—the justifiable ways in which benefits
and burdens are distributed in a society under prevailing
conditions of economic scarcity—is perhaps the central health
policy issue of our time, the dominant theme of this second
Bethesda Conference on ethics, and one which has a special
poignancy for those near the end of life.
It is beyond the scope of this report to analyze the health
care expenditures in patients near the end of life, much less to
suggest in what circumstances potentially beneficial care
should be given and when it should be withheld. It is commonly
held that older patients are often treated aggressively with
costly but futile technology at the end of life, thus driving up
total U.S. health care costs. Others regard this as a miscon-
ception and point out facts to the contrary. In a recently
published study entitled “Seven Deadly Myths—Uncovering
the Facts about the High Cost of the Last Year of Life,” it was
found that age was not a reliable predictor in determining who
would benefit from aggressive treatment; advance directives
frequently have little impact on treatment decisions; and
aggressive care for those over 65 accounted for only six-tenths
of 1% of the nation’s total health care bill (2).
In this section we examine the ethical issues raised in caring
for patients near the end of life and the particular tension
which exists for the cardiovascular specialist in the enlightened,
appropriate, and compassionate application of medical and
surgical technology to the individual patient, mindful of the
societal responsibilities with which he or she is entrusted.
Application of Complex Medical and Surgical
Interventions in the Elderly
Cast me not off in the time of old age; forsake me not when my
strength faileth.
—Psalms 71:9
Age-based stereotyping by which the elderly were once
dismissed as candidates for many forms of surgery and aggres-
sive therapies has been in decline but has not disappeared (3).
To the contrary, it is clear that age per se is a poor predictor of
medical outcomes. This is not to say that age is not an
important factor in clinical decision making. For example, age
is an independent risk factor for hospital mortality in patients
undergoing coronary artery bypass grafting. Univariate analy-
sis of 230,730 patients in the Society of Thoracic Surgeons
National Database harvest, 1995–1996, shows a mortality rate
of 1.77% for patients less than 65 years compared to 4.19% for
those 65 and older (4). Moreover, medical risk and cost
increase continuously with age. Operative mortality, perioper-
ative stroke rate, and mean postoperative length of stay for
isolated coronary artery bypass grafting as a function of age are
depicted in Figures 1 to 3 (5).
Outcomes data in other complex medical and surgical
interventions show similar increased risk with increasing age
(6,7). Despite the increased risk of adverse outcomes as a
function of age, the vast majority of elderly patients derive
significant benefit from such interventions (8–10).
Covert rationing based on ageism, i.e., a tendency to regard
older persons as debilitated or unworthy of attention, is
manifested as withholding appropriate care for “medical”
reasons. The elderly may be particularly vulnerable to mislead-
ing representations regarding the hazards and futility of com-
Figure 2. 1995 to 1996 Society of Thoracic Surgeons Cardiac Surgery
National Database: percent permanent stroke by age group for
isolated coronary artery bypass graft surgery.
Figure 1. 1995 to 1996 Society of Thoracic Surgeons Cardiac Surgery
National Database: percent operative mortality by age group for
isolated coronary artery bypass graft surgery.
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plex medical interventions in older patients, because of their
unwillingness to be a burden to their families or to society.
There are quite legitimate instances of rationing health care
based on age. Denial of organ transplantation to the elderly
because of the scarcity of donor organs is one example, which
is consistent with the ethic of distributive justice and has
become accepted medical and social policy.
Other clinical situations are less clear. The greater the risk,
the higher the cost, the more uncertainty as to the potential
benefit (especially when improved survival is one of the chief
benefits), the older the patient, the greater is the disposition to
withhold care.
Futile care will be discussed in a subsequent section, but
needs to be mentioned briefly here. Truly futile care in which
medical and surgical technology has no reasonable chance of
benefiting the patient is inappropriate and, worse, may prolong
suffering and waste scarce resources and is to be condemned
for any age patient no matter what the wishes of the patient or
family.
The cardiovascular specialist caring for elderly patients has
an intensified ethical responsibility in clinical decision-making.
The always difficult distinction between critical and terminal
illness is more difficult as patients near the end of their natural
lives. Patients who have outlived friends and are isolated from
family may not wish to undergo complex interventions, and
may not be able to articulate their preference to be left alone
and allowed to die. Family members, motivated by guilt rather
than compassion, may insist on aggressive care with little
chance of success. A risky intervention may be deferred
because of age only to be applied later in an emergency
situation in which the indications for treatment are clear, but a
favorable outcome much less likely.
Many believe that explicit rationing of expensive health care
for the elderly is inevitable, and will result from a public
discussion of societal priorities (3). Others believe that such a
public discussion would be so disruptive that it will not, and
should not occur, and that hidden rationing will be tacitly
accepted (11).
It is our position that ageism has no place in contemporary
clinical decision making, that complex medical and surgical
interventions have an important place in the care of the elderly
with due consideration for appropriateness based on clinical
experience and scientific knowledge, and consistent with the
patient’s wishes and best interests.
Palliative Care
It is not death, but dying which is terrible.
—Henry Fielding, Amelia (1751)
Palliative care near the end of life should be the least
controversial aspect of end of life decisions. Most medical care
is, in fact, palliative in contradistinction to preventive or
curative care. In the context of this section, palliative care
refers to the care of patients in the terminal stages of illness in
whom the goal of medical management is to provide comfort.
Such care has been, to an increasing extent, formalized into
“comfort care” clinical pathways.
In the 150th anniversary edition of the Code of Medical
Ethics of the American Medical Association (AMA), the first
principle enumerated is “A physician should be dedicated to
providing competent medical service with compassion and
respect for human dignity” (12). The 21st Bethesda Confer-
ence: “Ethics in Cardiovascular Medicine” states as its princi-
ple in guiding physician behavior, “A commitment to relieve
pain and suffering and when possible to heal both body and
mind” (1). These admonitions are not new but come from
Hippocrates and especially from Thomas Percival, the English
physician and philosopher, who published his code of ethics in
1803 and on which the AMA code was originally based.
Indeed, from antiquity to the present no one disagrees that a
patient’s suffering should be relieved. Why then is this an issue
for ethical consideration?
There are two areas that need to be discussed. First,
palliative care at the present time: how well is it being done,
how well are we educating new physicians about care at the end
of life, and what are the unique problems in caring for cardiac
patients at the end of life that differ from care for patients with
a more predictable time to death? Second, how does the
emergence of managed care influence the availability and
provision of adequate palliation?
How Well Are We Providing Palliative Care?
Since all agree that it should be done, how well are we
relieving pain and suffering near the end of life? Most residents
and many physicians, young and not so young, have had limited
experience dealing with patients and families when end of life
decisions must be made. It has been found that only 5 of 126
medical schools provide a separate course on the care of the
dying. In addition, of 7,048 residency programs, only 26 offer a
course on care at the end of life (13). Kathleen Foley of Sloan
Kettering Cancer Center in New York writing in the New
England Journal of Medicine states (14), “Several studies
concluded that poor communications between physicians and
Figure 3. 1995 to 1996 Society of Thoracic Surgeons Cardiac Surgery
National Database: mean postoperative length of stay by age group for
isolated coronary artery bypass graft surgery.
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patients, physician lack of knowledge about national guidelines
for such care and their lack of knowledge about control of
symptoms are barriers to the provision of good care at the end
of life” (15–17). The SUPPORT study (Study to Understand
Prognosis and Preferences for Outcomes and Risk of Treat-
ments) examined patients and families from five teaching
hospitals. In order to better understand the experience of dying
from the perspective of the surrogate decision makers who
were usually family members, a medical record review of 9,105
seriously ill patients was carried out (18). In this study approx-
imately half of the patients died and, when interviewing the
family members, it was found that 55% of the patients were
conscious during the last 3 days of life. Forty percent had
severe pain, 80% severe fatigue, and 63% had difficulty
tolerating physical or emotional symptoms. Another paper
from the same patient cohort examined patient opinions (19).
In this study patients were interviewed and, when they could
not be interviewed due to illness, a surrogate was interviewed.
Nearly 50% reported pain. After adjustment for confounding
variables, the older and sicker patients reported less pain, but
patients with greater co-morbidity, depression and anxiety
reported more pain. Pain was much more common in cancer
patients, especially in patients with cancer of the colon. Based
on the experience from the SUPPORT study and others, it
would seem that the provision of care for patients near the end
of life needs significant improvement, including control of pain
and other symptoms.
Although cardiovascular disease remains the number one
cause of death, the mode of death and therefore the care
required will vary according to the disease condition. Although
sudden death accounts for a large percentage of cardiovascular
deaths, the second leading condition appropriate for hospice
care behind cancer is heart failure. Whereas pain relief may be
the major requirement in patients with cancer, relief of symp-
toms such as dyspnea and profound weakness are the sine qua
non for palliative care of patients with heart failure. Depres-
sion and its many expressions is also a prominent feature in
patients dying of heart failure. Recognition and management
of depression should be vigorously pursued in patients ex-
pected to die as in those expected to recover. Once it is
apparent that the patient will not survive, it is crucial that
palliative care involve all appropriate measures including
continuing efforts to correct physiologic abnormalities which
are producing discomfort such as pulmonary congestion. Much
of the suffering experienced by heart failure patients is caused
by cardiorespiratory and other support devices. Many patients
receiving mechanical ventilation are conscious and aware, even
though incapable of communicating, and need to be relieved of
the support-device-related discomfort as much as possible.
Palliative Care in the Managed Care Environment
As managed care plays an increasing role as the engine of
cost containment, ethical issues regarding palliative care near
end of life specific to the managed care environment arise.
Under a fee-for-service system, physicians and hospitals are
rewarded for continuing efforts to sustain life and provide
comfort. Under capitated plans, financial incentives are struc-
tured to provide less care rather than more. Whereas conflicts
of interest are present in both fee-for-service and capitated
reimbursement systems, the latter creates a financial disincen-
tive to provide palliative care, especially over prolonged peri-
ods. The danger, posed by managed care, now well recognized,
is the possibility that economics can diminish palliative care in
favor of a hastened or assisted death (20). The AMA Code of
Medical Ethics states that quality of life is defined by the
patient’s interests and values. “This is not to be superseded by
avoidance of a burden for family or society.” “The duty of
patient advocacy is fundamental to physician-patient relation-
ships that should not be altered by the system of health care
delivery.” The goal of palliative care is to relieve pain and
suffering and to improve the quality of life, not necessarily the
duration of life. However, provision of competent palliative
care may result in an alteration in the duration of life as well,
but this should not be proscriptive if the primary goal of
palliation (relief of suffering) is being achieved.
The patient’s wishes may also be influenced by the physician
and the physician’s attitude toward palliative care. Emanuel
and Emanuel (21) found that patients with cancer and depres-
sion favored physicians who acknowledged willingness to assist
in death; patients with cancer suffering from pain viewed such
physicians with suspicion. Several studies have found that the
desire for death has been closely related to depression; pain
and lack of support are contributing factors. Depression
remains a major component of suffering which competent
palliative care may alleviate (21,22). In a managed care system,
the provision of competent palliative care should not be
compromised. Measures such as educating health care workers
and the public of the needs of the terminally ill and expanding
the use of hospice care, are important considerations for any
health care system.
Excellence in palliative care will not be cheap. Programma-
ble drug delivery skin patches, implantable pumps, and other
automated delivery systems may be expensive. Most important,
however, is the training and experience of physicians and other
care givers, and the commitment of resources. Neither, futile
care nor physician-assisted suicide should be allowed to sub-
stitute for competent palliative care at the end of life.
Futile Care
Futile care is that which provides little or no benefit to the
patient or which has proven to be useless in achieving its
desired effect. In struggling for a more precise definition
ethicists and physicians have sought to define futile care in
both quantitative and qualitative terms. Both approaches fall
short of their intended purpose of reaching a clear and
unambiguous definition of futility, the former because of the
inherent variability and subjectivity of physician experience,
and the latter because of the lack of consensus among patients
about what level of functional outcome would be considered
satisfactory or acceptable.
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Quantitative Definitions
Schneiderman and colleagues (23) define that a treatment
should be considered futile if it has failed to produce the
desired effect in 100 consecutive cases. Failure is defined as
death, permanent unconsciousness, or permanent dependence
on intensive medical care. This definition is subjective since
one physician’s last 100 cases may be very different from those
of another, and the reliance on selective recollection and
experiential prejudices make this definition even more incon-
sistent (24,25). Furthermore, although the major underlying
disease process may be the same, individual critical care cases
vary dramatically. Hence, defining what determines a cohort
group consisting of the last 100 like patients can be difficult if
not impossible. Furthermore, the literature defining quantita-
tive futility is sparce compared to the vast literature defining
successful interventions. For example, Faber-Langendoen pub-
lished a review that sought to demonstrate that cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation for patients with metastatic cancer was futile
(no survivors to hospital discharge in 11 cases) (26); con-
versely, the Sloan-Kettering group published a similar cohort
showing a 10% survival rate (27). These conflicting reports
simply underscore the need for further research.
Other attempts at defining quantitative futility have been
more lenient implying that the chances of success as very low
or rare (28,29). A recent survey revealed that most physicians
considered a treatment futile if there was less than a 10%
chance of achieving the intended goal (30). Surprisingly, 20%
of those physicians surveyed chose the threshold of 20% or
even higher as compatible with the definition of futility. This
wide difference in opinion by physicians as to the definition of
quantitative futility is in many ways a reflection of the varying
opinions in the medical and ethics literature on the subject.
Generally, quantitative futility for an individual patient with a
specific illness will depend on a combination of the results in
the medical literature pertaining to the case as well as to the
treating physician’s personal experience. Hence, this particular
estimate of futility will always be subject to inconsistency.
In speaking with families it is important to use words
carefully. A clear distinction must be made between treatment
and care. A specific treatment may be futile; care (especially
palliative care) is never futile.
The concept of futile care is not simply related to cost and
the ethic of distributive justice. Our professional integrity
demands choices based on factors beyond financial consider-
ations in recommending treatments to our patients. We reject
the notion that as physicians we will do anything so long as it
is paid for.
Qualitative Definitions
Qualitative definitions of futility are equally problematic.
This is because qualitative definitions rely on making value
judgments about quality of life (31) and when such quality is so
diminished as to render “allowing to die” the preferred option.
“Futile care is any clinical circumstance in which the doctor
and his consultants, consistent with the available medical
literature, conclude that further treatment (except for comfort
care) cannot within reasonable possibility, cure, ameliorate,
improve, or restore a quality of life that would be satisfactory
to the patient” (32).
The issue of what is an acceptable quality of life is clearly a
personal one. Ethicists and physicians agree that patient
autonomy should be paramount, and hence, the patient’s
values become the determining standard (23). But, often, the
patient’s views cannot be expressed at the time of need because
of unconsciousness or incompetence (33,34). When this is the
case, the physician in concert with others involved in the
patient’s care and with various family members should tackle
these issues with great sensitivity. Family members often have
difficulty being objective when making informed choices about
futile care of a loved one (35,36). Decisions are often influ-
enced by love, feelings of guilt, fear of loss or loneliness, or by
self gain. Often, the physician and health care team members
are expected to play a pivotal role in the determination of
qualitative futility. In this case, extreme caution should be
exercised and the patient’s best interests should be the over-
riding standard.
More recently, Schneiderman et al. (23) also included the
quality of life in their definition of futility: “If the treatment
fails to release the patient from being preoccupied with the
illness and incapable of achieving any other life goal, that
treatment should also be regarded as futile.” The majority of
citizens regard a life totally dependent on intrusive organ-
replacing medical care, when high brain functions are seriously
or permanently lost, to be a fate worse than death (37,38).
Although the attempts to define futile care more precisely
have been useful, we are left with the notion that the distinc-
tion between potentially beneficial and futile care is a complex
calculus which must take into account the individual patient’s
medical status, education, ethnicity, family support structure,
as well as the physician’s experience with and understanding of
the proposed intervention.
Decisions to Forego Treatment and Advance
Care Planning
During the past 20 years, a standard of practice has
emerged that recognizes the right of patients to forego life-
sustaining treatment, even if this results in their death. This
includes the right to withhold (not start) or withdraw (stop)
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, mechanical ventilation, dialy-
sis, antibiotics, and artificial nutrition and hydration. This right
is grounded in the ethical principle of respect for patient
autonomy and protected by the legal doctrine of informed
consent.
A valid consent has three elements: disclosure, capacity,
and voluntariness. The key elements of disclosure include the
risks and benefits of the proposed test or treatment as well as
any alternative tests or treatment. Although standards for
disclosure may vary from one jurisdiction to another, the
physician should disclose all the information that a reasonable
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person in the patient’s situation would want or need to know
before making a decision, including any information about
risks that are likely or serious. Moreover, it is prudent for the
physician to explain any benefits, risks or alternative tests or
treatments that may have special significance for the particular
patient. Effective communication skills are essential to the
process of obtaining informed consent. The physician should
spend sufficient time to ensure that the patient has the
opportunity to understand the information provided by the
physician and to have his/her questions answered.
Capacity can be defined as the ability to understand rele-
vant information and appreciate the consequences of a partic-
ular decision or lack of decision. Unfortunately, there are no
widely available clinical measures to assess patient capacity in
practice. If there is doubt about the assessment, consultation
from a psychiatrist, hospital attorney, or ethicist may be
helpful; the ultimate judge of a patient’s capacity is a court. If
the patient is deemed incapable, he/she should be told that
he/she has been deemed incapable, and that someone else will
be making decisions on his/her behalf. This should be done in
a sensitive manner appropriate to the clinical circumstances,
and the patient may wish to challenge the finding of incapacity.
Voluntariness means that patients should be able to make
treatment choices without undue external coercion.
In sum, capable, informed patients acting voluntarily have
the right to not start or stop life-sustaining treatment.
In theory incompetent patients have the same right as
competent individuals, but in practice they cannot exercise it.
To address this paradox, policy makers, judges and legislators
have developed a system known as “substitute decision mak-
ing” to permit others to exercise the incapable person’s right to
consent on his/her behalf.
Substitute decision making poses two main questions: “who
should make the decision for the incompetent person and how
should the decision be made?” The appropriate answer to
these questions varies from one jurisdiction to another and
physicians are encouraged to gain familiarity with the legal
standards in their place of practice. However, the overall goal
of substitute decision making is to approximate the decision
the patient would make if he/she were still capable to do so.
With regard to who should make decisions, the most
appropriate person is someone appointed by the patient
him/herself, while competent, through a proxy advance direc-
tive (AD) (39). Other substitute decision makers, in their usual
order or priority, include a court-appointed guardian, spouse,
child, parent, brother or sister, any other relative or concerned
friend. In some jurisdictions a public official will serve as
substitute decision maker for a patient who has no substitute
decision maker available.
The standards for how the decisions should be made, in
decreasing order of priority, are wishes, values and beliefs, and
best interests. Wishes are prior expressions by the patient, while
capable, that seem to apply to the actual decision that needs to
be made; sometimes patients will have recorded their wishes in
an AD. Values and beliefs are less specific than wishes but they
allow the substitute decision maker to impute what the patient
would have decided based on other choices the patient made in
his/her life and the patient’s approach to life in general; they
are often the answer to the question, “What would Fred have
wanted?” Best interests are “objective” estimates of the benefits
and burdens of treatment of the patient.
A true emergency is an exception to the usual requirement
to obtain informed consent. The justification for the exception
is that a reasonable person would want treatment, and the time
delay to obtain consent would result in serious harm to the
patient. The limit on this exception is when a patient had
refused the treatment previously, in which case an emergency
situation does not justify providing it.
Advance care planning (ACP) is a process of communica-
tion among patients, their health care providers, their families,
and important others regarding the kind of care that will be
considered appropriate when the patient cannot make deci-
sions (40).
ACP may contain written ADs. Completed by a person
when he/she is capable an AD is used at a time when the
person has become incapable. ADs indicate whom a person
would want to make treatment decisions on his or her behalf,
and/or what treatments a person would or would not want in
various situations.
The laws vary with respect to the scope of ADs, who can be
proxies, witnessing requirements, and procedures for activat-
ing the AD. Physicians should familiarize themselves with the
legislation in their jurisdiction.
Initial excitement toward ADs and ACP has been damp-
ened by the disappointing results of the SUPPORT study,
which showed no effect of ACP on various cost and utilization
outcomes (41). However, the SUPPORT study may not have
captured the most important outcome related to ACP—
helping people face death in the context of their families.
The primary role of the physician in ACP is that of
educator. The physician who raises the issue of ACP with a
patient is performing a valuable public education service. If a
patient requests assistance from a physician regarding ACP,
the physician should refer the patient to information sources
on ADs and ACP. Once a patient has learned about ADs and
ACP generally, the physician can perform an important service
by helping the patient tailor the instruction directive of the AD
to the patient’s own health situation. The physician can also
ensure that the patient has correctly interpreted the informa-
tion contained in preprinted ADs, and that the patient is
capable of completing an AD. Physicians should suggest that
their patients review their ADs and ACP when the patient’s
health status changes. When the patient becomes incapable,
and the AD takes effect, the physician will become involved. At
this point, the physician will seek consent for the proposed
treatment plan from the proxy(ies) appointed in the AD, as
discussed above on substitute decision making.
Culture and gender affect decisions to forego treatment and
advance care planning in unique and unchartered ways. Phy-
sicians should be vigilant for their effects and address these
issues with sensitivity and respect.
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Do Not Resuscitate Orders
Do not resuscitate (DNR) orders are initiated in institu-
tional settings (hospital, nursing home, hospice) to prevent
personnel working in these institutions from responding to a
cardiopulmonary arrest with resuscitation and life support in
patients who are near the end of life and who are not
candidates for aggressive therapies. DNR orders are usually
initiated by the patient’s physician in consultation with the
patient, if competent, and the patient’s family, or surrogates. A
competent patient may request DNR status; his/her desire not
to be resuscitated may be part of an AD.
It would be impossible to list all specific clinical circum-
stances in which DNR orders might be appropriate. Obvious
examples are patients in prolonged coma, advanced metastatic
cancer, advanced dementia requiring total care, and Class IV
heart failure (transplant not indicated).
DNR orders are often the initial step in a cascade of events
that follow the recognition and acknowledgment of a patient’s
terminal status, are a prerequisite to entering a formalized
“comfort pathway,” and may be followed by other steps
consistent with the patient’s wishes, such as withdrawal of life
sustaining treatment.
Physician-Assisted Suicide
The issue of doctor-assisted suicide is derived from the
confluence of expanded medical technology and patient auton-
omy, both relatively new developments for patients and physi-
cians.
Technology has allowed many patients to live years beyond
what would have been possible just a few decades ago with a
genuine quality of life. On the other hand, technology can
imprison persons within bodies which offer a very poor quality
of life and prolong the dying process. The overuse of technol-
ogy has led patients to fear dying more than death itself.
Medical technology has changed the way we die and the way
we think about death. As Daniel Callahan remarks, “what was
once a tame way to die has been replaced by a wild death with
endless tubes and treatments such as radiation, chemotherapy,
and the respirator with side-effects which frighten the patient”
(42).
The substitution of patient autonomy for physician pater-
nalism creates a new problem in the moral use of freedom.
Since the 1970s when paternalism became a bad word and was
replaced by the principle of autonomy, various means have
been used to guarantee that the desires of patients would be
respected. The principle of autonomy recognizes the patient’s
right to refuse treatment. An extension of this principle is the
right to control one’s death.
The proponents of physician-assisted suicide argue that to
take one’s life is to exercise to its fullest the principle of
autonomy and that an “act or practice of painlessly putting to
death persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease
is an act of mercy” (43). If one accepts the role of the physician
to include the obligation to relieve suffering and countenances
the ending of life by foregoing or withdrawing treatment, it can
be argued that one has already accepted in principle and in
practice doctor-assisted suicide.
Opponents of doctor-assisted suicide point out that auton-
omy is a limited principle, the duty to relieve suffering is a
limited duty, that there will always be some suffering in human
experience, and that the consequences of allowing assisted
suicide, especially by the healing profession, suggest a slippery-
slope with immoral results which we neither desire nor should
have in our civilized society.
Support for the slippery-slope argument can be found in the
Dutch experience where physician-assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia have been legalized. In response to three articles pub-
lished in the New England Journal of Medicine (44–46) describ-
ing Dutch studies of assisted suicide and euthanasia in The
Netherlands, Hendin et al. conclude in an editorial in the same
journal (47), “The 1990 and 1995 studies document that 59%
of Dutch physicians do not report their cases of assisted suicide
and euthanasia, more than 50% feel free to suggest euthanasia
to their patients, and about 25% admit to ending patient’s lives
without their consent.”
On June 26, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court voted unani-
mously to uphold state laws that make it a crime for physicians
to give life-ending medication to mentally competent, termi-
nally ill patients who want to die. In two separate decisions,
Washington v. Glucksberg (48), and Vacco v. Quill (49), the
Court rejected constitutional challenges to laws in Washington
and New York that criminalize physician-assisted suicide. In
doing so the Court broadly rejected the argument that either
the Due Process clause or the Equal Protection clause of the
U.S. Constitution guarantees terminally ill patients a right to
physician-assisted suicide. The Justices left the door open for
future challenges, however, suggesting in concurring opinions
that perhaps there might be particular situations quite different
from those in the Washington or New York cases in which an
interest in hastening death is legitimate and entitled to consti-
tutional protections (50).
As Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized in Vacco (51), a
moral distinction can be shown to exist between doctor-
assisted suicide and letting die. In letting die a fatal pathology
is the cause of death; in doctor-assisted suicide the physician
who administers the injection is the direct cause of death. In
letting die the method of death is determined by the disease; in
doctor-assisted suicide the physician or the patient chooses the
method. In letting die the intention is to recognize that further
treatment is futile; in doctor-assisted suicide the intention is to
hasten or complete that which medical science is unable to stop
(42).
We need to do a better job of pain management and
providing psychological support to those who suffer near the
end of life and we must recognize that our technology,
misapplied, may contribute to a sense of desperation that leads
to the consideration of euthanasia.
Are we willing to reject a tradition which goes back to the
age of Hippocrates and now ask the healer to actively, and with
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intention, become the agent of death for a competent, suffering
patient with a terminal disease?
Conclusions
● Cardiovascular physicians have an ethical obligation to
provide high quality end of life care.
● As society seeks to constrain costs of medical care, the
expenditure of resources in end of life situations becomes
a particularly inviting target for cost savings and intensi-
fies the ethical issues surrounding the care of this vulner-
able subset of patients.
● Although mortality, morbidity, and cost do increase with
age in the application of complex medical technology,
age, per se, is a poor predictor of medical outcomes. Such
applications properly selected, in elderly patients, are
associated with favorable, beneficial outcomes, often in
circumstances in which alternative management strate-
gies are not available or are not effective.
● Palliative care should provide relief of suffering and
preserve the dignity of patients who have end-stage heart
disease.
● Palliative care is valuable to patients and should be a
priority for resource allocation in health care systems.
● The knowledge and skills to provide good palliative care
should be included in undergraduate, graduate, and
postgraduate medical education.
● We encourage research in methods of provision of care at
the end of life.
● The physician should provide competent palliative care
regardless of financial considerations.
● Treatment that is expected to provide little sustained
benefit or has proven useless in achieving its desired
effect, should be discontinued in favor of palliative care,
despite pressures to pursue such futile treatment.
● Patients have the right to forgo life-sustaining treat-
ment—a right grounded in the ethical principle of respect
for patient autonomy and protected by the legal doctrine
of informed consent.
● The cardiovascular physician should play an important
role as educator and facilitator in ACP by patients and
families.
● We advocate palliative care and support patient decisions
to forgo treatment (we do not advocate or support
physician-assisted suicide).
Appendix
Case Studies for Task Force 2
Case 1. A family practitioner calls you about an 82-year old woman
in a nursing home with severe dementia who was found today to be in
pulmonary edema. The patient’s legal guardian is unavailable. The
patient had an echocardiogram 5 years ago for an episode of fluid
retention and has been on lasix and digoxin since.
What course should you follow?
Case 2. An 88-year old woman with end-stage congestive heart
failure is living with a niece, is bed bound and has very little appetite.
You see her at home and she asks for assurance that she won’t be
hospitalized again.
What should you tell her?
Case 3. A 73-year old man presents with a cold, cyanotic right lower
extremity, absent peripheral pulses and no motor function. The patient
had coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG) 10 years ago, is
known to have peripheral vascular disease (multiple peripheral angio-
plasties; bilateral carotid bruits), moderately impaired left ventricular
function (ejection fraction 0.4), chronic atrial fibrillation, diabetes
mellitus, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, and hemiparesis caused by a
prior stroke.
An embolectomy was done restoring blood flow to the lower
extremity. On the third postoperative day he sustained an anterior wall
myocardial infarction (MI) complicated by heart failure and cardio-
genic shock.
How should this patient be managed after the acute AMI? Should
further interventions be considered “futile” ? What additional infor-
mation (medical, functional, social, financial) is necessary to make
appropriate recommendations for subsequent care?
Case 4. A 75-year old man presents to the emergency room with a
leaking (blood in left pleural space) atherosclerotic aneurysm of the
descending thoracic aorta. He was known to have the aneurysm for
about five years, but elective aneurysmectomy was not recommended
because of several coexisting medical conditions, including emphy-
sema, a history of two MIs and a rest creatinine level of 3.0.
The patient is mentally alert, has solicitous family, and is eager to
know what his internist recommends. His internist calls in a cardiolo-
gist who treated the patient in the past and a cardiovascular surgeon
who saw the patient in consultation some years earlier and recom-
mended against elective aneurysmectomy at that time.
What should the consultants do?
Case 5. A prominent 75-year old retired physician sustained a
witnessed cardiac arrest, was successfully resuscitated, although he
sustained an aspiration pneumonia and remained unconscious. He was
intubated, placed on mechanical ventilation, given intravenous antibi-
otics and nasogastric tube feedings.
His family insisted he would recover and demanded frequent
progress reports. After 15 days he remained unresponsive and the
consensus of the physicians and nursing staff was that the outlook for
meaningful survival was hopeless. The family did not agree to the
recommendation to withdraw support.
How does the physician deal with such an impasse?
Case 6. A 73-year old man is transferred to your hospital with a
long history of hypertension and two remote MIs. The patient has
unstable angina with anterior ischemia on the electrocardiogram, a
creatinine of 3 mg%, and moderate chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease. Echocardiography reveals depressed left ventricular function;
coronary arteriography shows diffuse coronary occlusive disease with a
new 90% proximal left anterior descending coronary artery narrowing,
compared to a study done two years previously. The patient refuses
surgical revascularization and consents to angioplasty. During the
course of angioplasty, a left main dissection occurs and evidence of an
acute myocardial infarction and hypertension are noted in the cathe-
terization laboratory.
Should the patient undergo emergency CABG at this time?
Case 7. A 19-year old woman underwent a second cardiac trans-
plant six months ago. The first transplant was done at age 12 for
end-stage heart failure after multiple cardiac surgeries for congenital
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disease (transposition of the great arteries, ventricular septal defect,
subpulmonary stenosis). The second cardiac transplant was done after
the diagnosis of accelerated, graft coronary atherosclerosis and was
complicated by an episode of severe rejection in the early postopera-
tive period which was also treated successfully. The patient has been
receiving psychological support throughout. She now comes to you
telling you that she has decided that she no longer wants to live and has
stopped taking all immunosuppressive medications.
What do you do? What are your obligations to your patient?
Case 8. You have been following a 75-year old man with crippling
angina and such severe comorbidities that he cannot have surgery. He
has had several angioplasties, all of which were ineffective. He asks you
for barbiturates in large doses and says “it’s enough.” You are seeing
him at his assisted living center.
What should you do?
Case 9. A 75-year old retired electrical engineer had several heart
attacks at age 70. Heart failure resulted and required aggressive
treatment with antiotensin-converting enzyme inhibition, a diuretic
and digoxin. At age 71 he began having recurrent sustained symptom-
atic ventricular tachycardia which could not be completely prevented
with either sotalol or amiodarone. An implantable cardioverter-
defibrillator (ICD) was placed. The ICD fired three times over the next
four years. Recently heart failure symptoms worsened and patient
required admission to hospital for intravenous inotropic therapy.
Heart failure symptoms abated slightly but ventricular tachycardia
(VT) associated with severe hypotension occurred. The patient was
shocked multiple times while still awake. The patient demanded that
the ICD be turned off and that he be allowed to die. This was done and
the patient had another episode of VT which degenerated into
ventricular fibrillation and the patient died.
Can this action by the physician be considered as physician-assisted
suicide?
Case 10. A 65-year old man with dilated cardiomyopathy is
considered for transplantation with class IV heart failure. He was
noted to have severe fluid overload, was dependent on two intravenous
inotropes and was in renal failure.
He was alert, oriented 3 3, with a creatinine of 7.5 and a blood urea
nitrogen of 90. His ejection fraction was 10%; he had severe tricuspid
regurgitation with a pulmonary capillary wedge pressure of 42 mm Hg,
cardiac index of 1.61/min per m2 and PaO2 saturation of 38%. To reach
transplantation he required chronic hemodialysis and a left ventricular
assist device.
What type of care is appropriate?
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Task Force 3: Clinical Research in a Molecular Era and the Need to
Expand Its Ethical Imperatives
ROBERT ROBERTS, MD, FACC, CO-CHAIR, THOMAS J. RYAN, MD, FACC, CO-CHAIR
Ethical Consideration and the Conduct of
Clinical Trials: Introduction
In the 21st Bethesda Conference, the first to address Ethics
in Cardiovascular Medicine, it was clearly stated that “the
goals of scientific research define the major responsibilities of
the researcher: to acquire and interpret knowledge about
natural phenomenon and to communicate this information
accurately to others” (1). In addition it acknowledged that
many biomedical researchers have a threefold obligation that
arises simultaneously from their responsibilities to patient
care, clinical research and teaching that often engender con-
flict. Task Force IV of that Bethesda Conference discussed a
Scientific Responsibility and Integrity in Medical Research
with care and thoroughness such that the general topic re-
quires only our strong reaffirmation here with no major
abridgement necessary a decade later.
However, accompanying the increasing involvement of
commerce into medical care, we are also witnessing a shift of
funding of biomedical research away from the public and into
the private sector. Accordingly, it seems prudent to expand on
two statements made in the Bethesda 21 document relating to
the social contract of the scientist which states that research
should be undertaken with the intent of sharing findings with
the scientific community, sponsors and the public. The two
statements are: 1) “The investigator must accept that publicly
supported research is intended to yield public benefit; personal
gain, financial and otherwise, should only be incidental and not
at the expense of the public benefit”; and 2) “Research that is
entirely privately supported maybe to yield private benefit, but
the responsibilities of the investigator are, with few exceptions,
the same as for the investigator with public funding.” It follows
from this that industry or privately funded research should
follow the same accepted laboratory and research practices,
including all the elements of proper design, conduct and
reporting, as publicly funded research (2,3).
Trial Design
The immediate and long-term objectives of the research
should be clearly formulated and presented in a research
protocol that must receive approval by an Institutional Review
Board (IRB) operating in conformance with the regulations of
the Department of Health and Human Services. All investiga-
tors and IRB members are obliged to disclose any conflicts of
interest, financial and otherwise, that exist. This is the only way
to guarantee the protection of the rights and welfare of human
subjects (4), assure the humane use of laboratory animals (5)
and protect the safety of self, co-workers and the environment
(6,7).
The study design must effectively address the scientific
question and minimize the likelihood of incorrect or mislead-
ing results. Estimates of therapeutic benefit on clearly specified
endpoints must be realistic and based on other similar inves-
tigations, pilot data, appropriate meta-analyses or properly
analyzed observational studies to the extent they exist. This
well known tenant of trial design has relevance to both industry
sponsored and publicly funded research because it is on
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“estimates of benefit” that sample size is based which in turn
determines the budget that must be allocated to the study.
Data and Safety Monitoring Boards (DSMBs)
Influenced by the example and favorable impact of DSMBs
on the conduct of clinical trials funded by the National
Institutes of Health, it has now become axiomatic that conven-
tional clinical trials that involve patient risk require a properly
assembled DSMB (or a similar independent body charged with
the responsibility of periodic review). These Boards serve as a
safety net both for society at large and the investigational
subjects in particular where their primary goal is to serve as the
conscience of the study in ensuring patient safety and the
quality of the clinical study itself. The Board should include
members with expertise in medical ethics, biostatistics, as well
as the medical issues relevant to the subject and clinical trial
expertise.
The National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI)
recently developed new guidelines for the operation of DSMBs
(8) that specify the Board will regularly monitor the data from
the study, review the quality of performance of its operations
and, as appropriate, make recommendations to the principal
investigator and sponsor with respect to:
● Performance of the individual centers (including possible
recommendations to be taken regarding any center that
performs unsatisfactorily)
● Interim results of the study for evidence of efficacy or
adverse effects
● Possible early termination of the study because of early
attainment of study objectives, safety concerns or inade-
quate performance
● Desirability of proceeding to a full-scale trial upon com-
pletion of the initial or pilot phase, when appropriate,
and
● Possible modification of the study protocol
This Task Force believes these guidelines, which specifically
apply to government-funded clinical research, are applicable to
privately funded research when processes are not already
subject to regulatory controls. In addition, DSMBs should also
assume the responsibility of determining the relevance of
emerging data from other trials.
The responsibilities for review, interpretation and recom-
mendations based on highly confidential data gives rise to great
sensitivity within the cardiology and clinical trials research
community to the critical importance of avoiding conflict of
interest or the appearance thereof. Much has been written
about conflict of interest in science and medicine (1) and there
are those who debate it as an issue largely in need of financial
disclosure. In the matter of DSMBs we would subscribe to the
conflict of interest statement generated by the NHLBI and
acknowledge that it extends to matters relating not only to
industrial relationships but to professional and scientific con-
flicts as well (9). David Blumenthal (personal communication,
March 1998) has pointed out that 54% of research is now
supported by industry in the United States and that the
collaboration of life science faculty from the academic medical
center with the businessperson from venture capital often
beget valuable products of research (10). These include lucra-
tive patents, valuable trade secrets and potential great wealth
for investigators, all of which may serve to increase the
likelihood of bias and lower the barriers for fraud. The moral
imperative for handling fraud, however, has always been clear.
Less clear are the answers to some of the continuing
questions arising from clinical research regardless of funding
source, such as:
● How many more patients do we need to put at risk?
● How do you apply stopping rules when one variable is
both a marker of safety and an endpoint variable?
● In those pharmacologic or procedural studies where
bleeding is an acknowledged risk, how many transfusions
should be considered excessive? What number is accept-
able?
● What is the equitable way of arriving at stopping rules for
futility?
The answer to these questions in an individual study can
only be determined by an assessment of the potential risks and
benefits by a knowledgeable independent body, free of bias
and conflicts of interest.
Reporting of Research
Investigators are responsible for reporting research clearly,
accurately, completely and honestly. As much care must be
devoted to identifying and reporting data that reject the
hypothesis being tested as is given to identifying and reporting
data that support it. Research results should be reported in a
timely fashion and in the formal literature of science as well as
at its scientific meetings.
As biomedical scientists and trialists are increasingly enter-
ing the world of for-profit commerce, publishing the results of
negative trials or results that may be interpreted as unfavorable
for the sponsor are giving rise to deep concern. There are
increasing experiences of investigators confronting opposition
and even suppression of the publication of trial results that are
deemed unfavorable “in the marketplace” (11). Here the
investigator should obtain a clear expression of what the
publication policy will be in writing before undertaking sponsored
research. Such an understanding should clearly indicate full
access to all pertinent data, without restriction by the investi-
gators.
Patient Data Confidentiality
The security and confidentiality of clinical information on
patients has been the focus of numerous legislative initiatives
at the federal and state levels (12). There has been an
increasing tendency to restrict access to identified patient data
for any reason. Clearly, there are good reasons to protect
patients who may see their lives severely disrupted by the
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malicious or accidental release of such highly confidential
information. There have been cases where insurance compa-
nies and employers have used medical record information to
deny insurance coverage or employment. Thus, the fear of
being identified may cause patients to avoid seeking care.
The Task Force recognizes the debate centering upon the
need to track patients over spans of time and at the same time
assuring patient confidentiality. In order to do this, the inves-
tigator must take appropriate measures to protect the privacy
of individuals, to ensure confidentiality and to prevent harm to
participants in research studies.
These issues present important ethical and legal consider-
ations that are likely to be discussed in the forthcoming report
of the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics
(NCVHS).
Background to Genetics
Medical bioethics is usually revisited when major changes
occur such as development of a new disease or a new therapy.
The recent application of the techniques of molecular biology
in medicine, and in particular in molecular genetics, is ex-
pected to revolutionize both the diagnosis and treatment of
many diseases including cardiovascular disorders. The impact
of procedures such as genetic screening for risk factors will
probably exceed that of any previous major change in health
care (including health maintenance organizations). It is threat-
ening to affect major safety umbrellas of society, such as life
and health insurance and employee rights, or may even
influence selection of one’s marriage partner. Some have
referred to it as the civil rights issue of the 21st century.
Molecular biology had its founding in 1953 by Watson and
Crick (13), but the birth of modern molecular biology is usually
attributed to the 1970s (14). It was then that the techniques
evolved to generate recombinant DNA molecules and to clone
multiple copies of a specific DNA fragment. The era of genetic
engineering was born and has essentially undergone exponen-
tial growth since that time. Molecular genetics was specifically
boosted in 1978 (15), with the development of more conve-
nient chromosomal markers and greatly accelerated in 1989
with the development of short tandem repeat markers that
spanned the human genome and could be detected in hours by
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) rather than days, as was
necessary with previous markers using Southern blotting.
These advances together with improved computerized tech-
niques made it possible to map the chromosomal location
(locus) of a gene responsible for disease even in a small family
(7 to 10 living affected) without the necessity of knowing the
specific etiology or responsible protein. PCR provides a means
of within 3 to 4 hours of obtaining 1 million copies or in 24
hours of 1 billion copies of a DNA fragment, which signifi-
cantly upstages cloning with a maximum capacity of 1 million
copies and requires days to weeks. The expected rapidity and
the impact are well subtended by the statement of Leroy Hood
during his plenary address of the 1991 Annual Scientific
Session of the American College of Cardiology: “appropriate
application of the techniques of molecular biology and
genetics will advance cardiology more over the next 20 years
than has occurred in the preceding 2000.” This was appro-
priately balanced by Francis Collins, Director of the Human
Genome Project, in his statement “Genetic testing has the
potential to revolutionize medicine. But revolutions can
have casualties.”
Human Molecular Genetics and Its Progress
In the late 1980s the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
and the Department of Energy (DOE) conceived a mammoth
project to be referred to as the Human Genome Project
(HGP) (16). The goal of the HGP initiated in 1990 was to
sequence the whole of the human genome by 2005. The
genome refers to the DNA inside the nucleus of a cell which
contains all of the genes required to make a human being. The
number of genes responsible for a human being is estimated to
be between 50,000 and 100,000. The human genome consist of
multiple copies of four bases—adenine, thymidine, cytosine,
and guanine—each of which is attached to a sugar deoxyribose
and a phosphate group which in turn are strung together in a
linear sequence. The sequence whereby these four bases are
joined together determines the information to be passed on to
the next generation. The number of bases in a gene probably
averages 20,000 but varies from a few thousand to millions.
The DNA of the human genome is contained in 23 chromo-
somes; 22 are paired with a duplicate homologous chromo-
some and the remaining unpaired are the X and Y, giving a
total of 46. Each chromosome is a single DNA molecule.
Although ones speaks of one human genome, there is of course
many human genomes since there is enough variation in the
sequence of the DNA from one individual to the other to make
each genome unique. It is this unique sequence of each
genome that is exploited in forensic medicine and in many
other situations. Nevertheless, the sequence difference from
one individual to another is extremely minute, with less than
one unique base in every 1000, the reciprocal being 99.9% of
the DNA sequence is identical. Given there are 3 billion base
pairs in the human genome, the sequence difference account-
ing for the difference among all humankind is at maximal a
total of only 3 million base pairs. It is likely that many of these
changes (mutations) are of minimal significance or occur
infrequently, thus, frequent significant mutations may number
only a few hundred thousand. Once these are known (which is
only a few years away), detection should be feasible and rapid.
The HGP has several interim subsidiary goals such as devel-
oping a genetic map with landmarks every million base pairs.
This was completed ahead of schedule in 1994 with over 5,000
markers spanning the chromosomes separated by only 700,000
base pairs. A second goal was development of a physical map
in which unique sequences of 100 to 300 base pairs would be
identified every 100,000 base pairs referred to as sequence
tagged sites (STS) to be completed in 1998. Since only about
5% to 10% of the available DNA exits the nucleus to code for
protein (expressed), another goal was to tag every 100,000
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bases of the expressed DNA by identifying 100 to 200 unique
sequences referred to as expressed tagged sequences (ESTs) as
opposed to the STS which may or may not be expressed. Over
50,000 such expressed genes have been in part cloned, tagged
with ESTs, and stored in various bacterial libraries. A world-
wide computerized gene bank has been established for infor-
mation accessibility. The overall project is considered ahead of
schedule by at least two years (2003 vs 2005). It is highly likely
that if the exponential growth continues, the project will be
completed even earlier. The date of completion is almost
irrelevant to the ethical issues since thousands of genes will be
identified by the year 2000 and for most, the function will be
unknown.
It will represent a new paradigm in medicine, namely
instead of searching for the etiology of a disease, there will be
thousands of etiologies (genes) searching for a disease. There
is an intense thrust behind the HGP since it is assumed that a
host of benefits (diagnosis, therapies and products) will auto-
matically follow in the wake of sequencing the human genome.
The biotechnology industry is already a multibillion dollar
concern; the use of DNA in the courts is now permissible and
routine. The success of the HGP, namely, the development of
a genetic map, a physical map, a worldwide gene bank, was
equally matched by the success of independent investigators
who rapidly and wisely took advantage of the new information.
This has accelerated not only the identification of genes
responsible for disease but also the development of promising
forms of therapy. The European age of discovery of our earth
by notable explorers such as Vasco da Gama and Columbus
was continued with man’s search to understand the earth’s
atomic and subatomic structure. The HGP is an equivalent
search to understand life and oneself by discovering the
fundamental blocks that design the body structure and imple-
ment the many functions that must be integrated to respond
appropriately to the environment. In an attempt to dramatize
the HGP, it has been compared to that of the Manhattan
Project (the atomic bomb), or the Apollo Project (man on the
moon). While all of these projects gave rise to a new body of
information and spurred a new set of societal, legal and ethical
concerns, the effects of the HGP on each individual will be
much greater, the nature of which will be unlike any previous
revolution. There is little doubt that decoding all of human
genes will represent a giant step toward unraveling the mys-
teries of life.
The alphabet of DNA is simple, consisting of only four
letters, referred to as A, C, G, and T, which correspond to
adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymidine. Proteins have a
slightly more complex alphabet of 20 letters which refer to the
building blocks of proteins, namely the 20 amino acids. Nature
devised a universal translation code to go from DNA to protein
whereby messenger RNA (single-stranded) copied from the
DNA leaves the nucleus with the sequence of bases that in turn
codes for the amino acids and the sequence whereby they are
joined together in the protein. Each amino acid is encoded in
a condon of three bases together with start and stop
condons. It should be evident that any mutations that cause
disease must affect the amino acid sequence of the protein
to have an effect on function. The genes remain aloof from
plebeian activities but by being responsible for the regula-
tion and synthesis of proteins are also responsible for all of
the body’s activities.
Patterns of Inheritance Relevant to
Genetic Testing
Unfortunately, inherited diseases do not follow a single
pattern and do not affect both sexes to the same extent. The
complexity of even simple Mendelian inheritance makes ge-
netic testing less straightforward than desired. Diseases due to
a single gene referred to as monogenic disorders follow
Mendelian inheritance while those due to multiple genes,
referred to polygenic disorders, do not follow Mendelian
inheritance. Single gene disorders are classified as autosomal
dominant, autosomal recessive, or X-linked. Everyone has two
copies of each gene; however, in autosomal dominant despite
only one gene being mutated, it is enough to induce the
disease, hence the name dominant. Diseases inherited as
autosomal dominant (AD) have vertical transmission affecting
each generation with 50% of the offspring having the gene and
affects males and females equally. In contrast, recessive disor-
ders require both genes to be mutated to get the disease, which
introduces the term “carrier,” meaning that someone who has
an abnormal and a normal gene will not get the disease, but if
they mate with a spouse that is a carrier and produce an
offspring, 25% will have the disease, 50% will be a carrier, and
the remaining 25% will be normal. The transmission is not
vertical and thus a generation may occur without anyone
having the disease. In X-linked disease, the female seldom
develops the disease (has two X chromosomes) while the male
having only one copy of the X chromosome almost always
develops the disease. Inherited diseases of the mitochondria
are unique in that the mitochondria has its own DNA which
makes 37 genes in the human. However, the mitochondrial
DNA can only be obtained from the female since mitochondria
are absence from the sperm. Thus, familial disease of mito-
chondrial DNA must have a maternal origin, but once inher-
ited, affects both males and females and may be recessive or
dominant. The monogenic disorders are further complicated
by the terms referred to as penetrance and expressivity.
Penetrance is defined as the percentage of individuals with the
mutant gene who develop the disease. The penetrance of genes
can vary anywhere from 30% to 100%. Expressivity refers to
the marked variation in clinical features manifested by the
same gene or even the same mutation.
The relevance of this information with respect to mono-
genic disorders for genetic screening is illustrated by an
autosomal dominant disease such as hypertrophic cardiomy-
opathy (HCM). In this disease, despite having the mutant
gene, most individuals have no feature of the disease until after
puberty and other individuals may not develop any feature of
the disease throughout their lifetime. Secondly, even with the
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same mutation within the same family, there is marked vari-
ability with respect to the severity of the disease, the incidence
of sudden death, the number of clinical features manifested, as
well as the length of their lifespan. It is the rule in autosomal
dominant disease that clinical features are not manifested until
the second, third or fourth decade of life. In conjunction with
all of these considerations, it is now necessary to take into
account that even for monogenic disorders, other genes re-
ferred to as modifier genes can play a pivotal role in whether
they develop the disease and the extent and severity. In the
case of HCM, if one happens to also inherit the DD allele for
the angiotensin-converting enzyme gene as opposed to the II
alleles, the extent of cardiac hypertrophy is much greater with
the former and the incidence of sudden death is significantly
increased. Similar modification is observed with the alleles of
endothelin gene and as we identify the thousands of genes that
are routinely used to maintain the heart as an organ, we can
anticipate many modifier genes for most monogenic disorders.
Gene to gene interaction is in part responsible for the variation
in penetrance and expressivity of a particular mutation within
the same family. Lastly, we must consider the influence of the
environment. Interaction of the primary causative gene and its
modifier genes with the environment plays a major role in the
developed phenotype (clinical features). This is dramatically
demonstrated in the case of familial HCM (FHCM) due to
beta-MHC (17). beta-MHC is abnormal throughout the heart
(right and left ventricles) and in over half of the skeletal
muscles, yet the disease is virtually confined to the left
ventricle. The development of the high pressure in the left
ventricle exploits the propensity of the mutant beta-MHC gene
to develop left ventricular hypertrophy, whereas the work load
in the right ventricle or skeletal muscles is unable to do so. In
determining genetic risk, it is necessary to consider not only the
primary mutant gene, but gene modifiers, environmental risk
factors, and the natural history of the disease associate with a
particular mutation.
While simple monogenic disorders exhibit several caveats
to be considered for genetic screening and diagnosis, the
complexity of the polygenic disorders cannot yet be anticipated
due to our lack of knowledge in this form of inherited disease.
These are disorders which we think make up 60% of all human
disease. They require multiple genes coordinated together to
induce the disease. One example is atherosclerosis, where we
know that many components enter into the ultimate phenotype
of myocardial infarction and death. It is known that smooth
muscle proliferation is a component, as are accumulation of
macrophages and their inflammatory cytokines, the develop-
ment of thrombosis and altered vasomotor tone. Thus, multi-
ple genes are involved with multiple distinct functions that
must come together within an individual and frequently will
only manifest the disease if interacting with the appropriate
triggering environmental factors (smoking, high cholesterol).
Genetic testing for polygenic disorders is in its infancy at this
time but will inevitably be resolved to play a major role in risk
stratification in the near future.
The Need for Widespread Education
in Genetics
Education of the cardiovascular physician and allied health
personnel in the fundamentals of molecular genetics together
with the implications for genetic diagnosis, testing and coun-
seling is recommended as essential. It is recommended that the
American College of Cardiology (ACC) take a leadership role
in providing such educational programs. Recent surveys show
that most professionals do not have the knowledge or neces-
sary background to integrate genetics into clinical practice. It is
estimated that less than one third of physicians ordering
genetic tests are capable of interpreting their results. Since
genetics is extremely new to cardiology, it is more likely to be
only 5% to 10% who have any understanding of genetic testing.
As genetic tests and therapies become available, there will be
too few genetic counselors and medical geneticists to meet the
demands for present-day testing and services let alone what it
will be in the year 2000 (18).
The Ethical, Legal and Social Implications
of the HGP
It was recognized from the very beginning by Jim Watson
and his colleagues that the HGP would require a parallel
formal initiative to anticipate the ethical, legal and societal
implications (ELSI) of this dramatic paradigm. The NIH
allocated 5% of the HGP budget for ELSI and the DOE 3% of
the HGP budget. The ethical, legal and social concerns have
previously been addressed on a case by case basis. The
accelerated pace of new discoveries from HGP beckons a more
global approach. This led to the creation of ELSI which is a
grant-making and policy-making body within the NIH. A
detailed review of the HGP and ELSI has been prepared by
the U.S. Department of Energy and the Human Genome
Project and made available on the Internet (http://
www.ornl.gov/hgmis/tko/). The HGP will inevitably lead to
widespread genetic testing that will be faster, cheaper, more
accurate and applicable to a multitude of human diseases. The
problems related to research in the field of molecular biology
and genetics such as gene therapy were anticipated very early.
In 1975 the National Academy of Sciences formed the NIH
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) which was
created to oversee and approve the safety of experimentation
in molecular biology and genetics. In a commission led by
Congressman Albert Gore, Jr., the distinction was made
between gene therapy for somatic cells and that of germline
cells. This brought to the forefront that gene therapy was not
morally different from other forms of experimental therapies
as long as it did not involve germline cells. This was interpreted
to mean that gene therapy should not involve eugenics. The
recent bill in 1997 by President Clinton upstaged this by
establishing that any attempt to clone a human being would be
illegal. The recommendations by RAC pertained to research
which together with those outlined for research in general
(1991 Bethesda Conference and the preceding discussion)
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continue to provide necessary guidelines for research in this
arena. The working group for ELSI developed an agenda
which has as its main goals as follows: 1) stimulate research on
issues through grant making; 2) refine the research agenda
through workshops, commissioned papers and invited lectures;
3) solicit public input; 4) provide massive education through
multiple media including the Internet; and lastly, 5) encourage
international collaboration. A major objective would be to
develop policies regarding professional, institutional, govern-
mental, and societal levels to ensure that genetic information
would be used to maximize benefit to individuals and society.
Three issues were identified as particularly important: privacy
of genetic information, safety and efficacy of new testing
options and fairness in the use of genetic information. Never-
theless, as indicated by the group at the time, ELSI has no
authority to effect policy and no privileged route to communi-
cate the information it would gather to the national policy
arena.
Protecting the Privacy of
Genetic Information
A central and major problem to be solved is maintaining
confidentiality on genetic information acquired by the physi-
cian or otherwise (19). While confidentiality of information
exchanged between physician and patient have been relatively
protected, there have been no formal legal measures to protect
this information from getting into the hands of third parties
such as insurance companies. The “perils” of the loss of
insurability and employability together with the stigmatization
that may follow if genetic information is available to third
parties such as life insurance companies, medical insurance
companies, and employment agencies could be frightening.
There is certainly no question that genetic screening for risk
factors whether it be the long QT syndrome, Alzheimers
disease or hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, raises many impor-
tant and difficult issues. The problems are real. They are here
now. Attempts in several states have been made to prohibit
genetic discrimination.
State and Federal Legislation/Regulation
In 1975, North Carolina passed legislation prohibiting
employers from discriminating against individuals with the
trait or the disease of sickle cell anemia (20), and four other
states have passed similar laws. In 1989, Oregon made it
unlawful for an employer to subject an employee to different
types of tests such as a breath analyzer (21). While genetic
screening was not mentioned, it is conceivable that it might be
interpreted to include such a test in 1997. In 1991, Wisconsin
prohibited workplace discrimination by prohibiting the em-
ployer access to genetic test results (22). Wisconsin’s criminal
code also specifically makes it unlawful to disclose genetic
information without written and informed consent of the
individual (23). New Jersey went a step further and prohibits
retaliation by employers if an employee refuses to take a
genetic test (24). In the state of New York an employer may
require a specified genetic test as a condition of employment
where such a test is shown to be directly related to the
employer’s job or occupational environment. Recently, several
federal initiatives have been developed by the Equal Oppor-
tunity Employment (EOE) Commission to prevent genetic
discrimination. One bill typifying the contents of these initia-
tives was that introduced by Domenici entitled To protect the
genetic privacy of individuals and for other purposes (S. 1895,
June 24, 1996). All bills concerning genetic privacy and dis-
crimination were defeated in 1996. Five separate pieces of
legislature dealing with genetic information confidentiality and
privacy have been introduced in 1997 and are now being
considered by Congress. A major concern of the Domenici bill
in 1996 was the proclamation that the DNA sample remain the
property of the individual and could be withdrawn or elimi-
nated at the will of the individual. This would significantly
curtail genetic research. The 1997 bill by Domenici (bill 422) is
much improved and no longer states the DNA sample should
be the property of the donor. Anonymous use of the sample
prospectively or retrospectively is not restricted.
NAPBC and ELSI Group Recommendations
A major concern of the various attempts by federal agencies
to protect the individual’s privacy is they may also deny the
individual and society the benefits of genetic testing. Thus, the
hereditary susceptibility working group of the National Action
Plan on Breast Cancer (NAPBC) coordinated by the PHS
Office on Women’s Health, recently joined with the NIH/DOE
ELSI group to address the issue of genetic information in the
workplace. It is hoped that in the future, legislative and
regulatory strategies to address discrimination and privacy in
the workplace will be considered along the NAPBC and ELSI
Working Group recommendations recently published in Sci-
ence (25). These recommendations are indicated below:
1. Employment organizations should be prohibited from using
genetic information to affect the hiring of an individual or to
affect the terms, conditions, privileges, benefits, or termina-
tion of employment unless the employment organization
can provide that this information is job related and consis-
tent with business necessity.
2. Employment organizations should be prohibited from re-
questing or requiring collection or disclosure of genetic
information prior to a conditional offer of employment, and
under all other circumstances, employment organization
should be prohibited from requesting or requiring collec-
tion or disclosure of genetic information unless the employ-
ment organization can provide this information is job
related and consistent with business necessity, or otherwise
mandated by law. Written and informed consent should be
required for each request, collection or disclosure.
3. Employment organizations should be restricted from access
to genetic information contained in medical records re-
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leased by individuals as a condition of employment, in
claims filed for reimbursement of health care costs, and
other sources.
4. Employment organizations should be prohibited from re-
leasing genetic information without prior written authori-
zation of the individual. Written authorization should be
required for each disclosure and include to whom the
disclosure will be made.
5. Violators of these provisions should be subject to strong
enforcement mechanisms, including a private right of ac-
tion.
6. The Task Force recommends genetic testing be made
available to individuals in the context of clinical investiga-
tion and research, however, the information obtained must
remain available only to the patient, physician, and investi-
gator. Information must not be made available to any other
party or individual.
It is hoped that these recommendations will stimulate a
comprehensive approach to address genetic privacy and dis-
crimination not only in the workplace but also in research
genetic testing and for group and individual insurances. It must
be appreciated that just as the science of genetic screening and
gene therapy are rapidly evolving, so will the legislature and
ethics evolve to protect both societal and individual rights. The
sensitivity and potential devastating effects of genetic risk
stratification must, by its very nature, be analyzed by many
legislative groups before a final decision can be expected.
Genetic Diagnosis and Screening
There is consensus on certain rules that must be followed in
performing genetic testing as follows: 1) informed written
consent must be obtained prior to obtaining the sample; 2)
genetic testing must not be performed unless accompanied
with genetic counseling; and 3) every effort should be made to
provide the necessary education in terms understandable to
the concerned individual. There is not, as yet, any consensus on
who should undergo genetic testing, how to protect the privacy
of the results, and how this information will be applied in the
routine practice of medicine. Presently, most genetic testing in
cardiology is performed as research and as such is regulated by
RAC and the local Institutional Review Board. In discussing
who should undergo genetic testing, one other question that
must be asked, will it affect the natural course or overall
management of the disease? Prevention and treatment often
follow more widespread application of diagnostic testing, but
genetic testing because of its potential stigmatization and other
deleterious effects, cannot perhaps be performed so freely.
Task Force Recommendations
The following guidelines are offered for the evolving debate
on the clinical, educational, ethical, social and legal issues
regarding genetic testing: 1) The use of genetic testing and
diagnosis as a research tool should continue along the guide-
lines outlined for research. 2) Genetic testing (usually prena-
tal) for devastating fetal disease or early onset disease, such as
Down syndrome, is performed routinely and should be contin-
ued. It has been shown if the results are positive whether the
parents seek an abortion or not the information provided is
considered beneficial. 3) Use of genetic testing in someone
with a phenotype to confirm or exclude a genetic cause, should
be permitted. An example would be FHCM with concomitant
hypertension. 4) In families with a known history of a familial
disease, genetic testing when sought by a family member
should be performed. Testing of other members of the family
should be performed only at their request. 5) Testing at birth
or during childhood for asymptomatic disorders that develop
later in life remain investigational until more data are avail-
able. Should one test for hyperlipidemia which is associated
with morbidity and mortality in the third, fourth or fifth
decade? While there is no specific therapy to cure the defect,
the use of appropriate diet and lipid-lowering agents particu-
larly when implemented in early adolescence or even as a child,
are likely to markedly decrease morbidity, prolong life and
possibly bridge the gap until a more appropriate cure arises.
Such disease would benefit from genetic testing prior to
adolescence as well as providing the opportunity for genetic
counseling with respect to marriage or having children. Should
someone screen at birth for a recessive disorder in the parent?
If one parent is positive, the other parent must be checked and
if both are positive, such as for Tay-Sachs’ disease, then the
choice is whether they should have a child or if they wait until
one child is born then genetic testing would provide advice as
to whether they should have other children or consider the use
of a surrogate mother or father. Others would argue that with
results of genetic testing parents can be advised about future
pregnancies and the genetic risk of recurrence. Nevertheless,
testing for late-onset diseases at birth, although increasingly
possible, is often not recommended unless preventive treat-
ments exist. It has been customary not to perform genetic
screening in high school students unless there is an immediate
medical benefit. However, recent studies from Montreal and
Hong Kong show that genetic screening during high school has
successfully decreased the incidence of Tay-Sachs disease and
beta-thalassemia. A major issue facing the cardiovascular
disorder of FHCM, the most common cause of sudden death in
the young, particularly in the athlete, is whether athletes at the
high school and college level with a family history or suspected
HCM phenotype should be screened prior to participating in
competitive sports.
Medical Insurance
Medical insurance cannot be determined on the presence
or absence of disease risk. It does indeed beckon the need for
a universal health insurance program. If genetic risk is assessed
as priority for medical insurance, it would be devastating and
inhuman. This must be interpreted in the context of having
available all of the genes for humankind, which would leave
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legitimately or illegitimately a significant proportion of the
population uninsured and stigmatized.
An Overall Recommendation
The beneficial effects of the application of the techniques of
molecular biology cannot be overestimated at this time. We
must, therefore, follow the advice of Thomas Jefferson, one of
the founding fathers of America when he said: “We must
continue to pursue truth but with reason.” Others might say it
is more judgment we need than reason.
Appendix
Case Studies for Task Force 3
Case 1. A 13-year old world-class gymnast has experienced several
episodes of syncope while performing. She has a long QT interval. You
recommend that the patient refrain from competitive sports and
receive appropriate therapy. The parents and child decline to follow
your advice.
What is the physician’s obligation?
Case 2. Clinical trial of a cardiovascular drug. A preliminary trial
demonstrates significant benefit. Two years into the main four-year
trial, the DSMB ascertains that there is significant harm in the
treatment group and recommends that the trial be stopped. The
principal investigator refuses, arguing that this is a “statistical quirk.”
What are the ethical issues? What processes should be followed?
Case 3. A large multicenter study of an established cholesterol-
lowering agent shows equivocal to negative results. The sponsor elects
not to publish the results.
What is the appropriate response of the principal investigator?
What is the role of the DSMB?
Case 4. The DSMB of a large study evaluating a promising agent
that prevents restenoses following interventional procedures notes
halfway into the trial that there is an excess of bleeding complications
in the group receiving the active agent. One month earlier, a European
study of a related agent was published, showing a significant reduction
of the restenoses rate, with an increased but acceptable rate of
bleeding complications.
How should the DSMB evaluate and respond to this situation?
Case 5. A young man 17 years old comes to the family physician
accompanied by his father, who has been informed by the school
physician that his son may have an enlarged heart and should be seen
by a cardiologist. Examination of this young man and Doppler
echocardiography show that he has familial hypertrophic cardiomyop-
athy (HCM). In addition, the mutation is shown to be Arg403 Gln,
which is associated with a high incidence of premature sudden death.
Electrophysiologic testing shows that unifocal ventricular tachycardia
is inducible with a single stimulus. An indwelling defibrillator is
recommended together with genetic counseling that includes exami-
nation of the rest of the family. However, the family physician feels
that it is a “bit too much to insert a pacemaker for someone at this
young age.” Approximately 10 days later the young man is found dead
in bed by his father, who within hours contacts the genetic counselor
who then informs the family physician of this event. We know that
there is another 15-year old at home who is playing football.
Is the family physician liable for negligence? Is it the responsibility
of the cardiologist to insist that the rest of the family at home be
evaluated for HCM and/or undergo genetic testing? Is the cardiologist
liable for allowing the person to go home without the ICD? (P.S. One
of the siblings did have familial HCM and did have a defibrillator
inserted two days after his brother’s funeral.)
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